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Issues: Whether damages under Section 14B of the Employees Provident Fund & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 require proof of mens rea or actus reus, or whether default in payment of provident fund contribution by itself is sufficient to sustain the levy.
Analysis: Section 14B is a civil remedial provision intended to secure compliance with the statutory obligation to deposit provident fund contributions. The Court relied on the settled position that, in cases of breach of civil obligations, the existence of mens rea is not a necessary ingredient unless the statute indicates otherwise. It distinguished earlier authority that had read mens rea into analogous provisions and preferred the binding three-Judge Bench view that penalty or damages may follow once the statutory default is established. The Court also noted that the employer had been proceeded against under Section 7A for determination of dues and that the delay in payment constituted a breach of the statutory obligation attracting damages under Section 14B.
Conclusion: Mens rea or actus reus is not required for levy of damages under Section 14B, and the employer's default in payment of EPF contribution is sufficient to justify the damages.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a welfare statute creates a civil liability for default in statutory contribution, damages or penalty may be imposed on proof of the default alone, unless the statute expressly makes guilty intention an ingredient.