Quasi-judicial redemption discretion under customs law must be exercised independently, fairly, and on relevant considerations.

Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 confers a quasi-judicial discretion on the adjudicating officer to allow redemption of confiscated goods on payment of fine, and that discretion must be exercised independently, fairly, and on relevant considerations rather than under binding Board directions. The text also states that an absolute confiscation order is vulnerable where the authority departs from consistent prior treatment without justification, relies on unsupported assumptions, or is influenced by irrelevant and biased considerations. It further notes that consistent comparable cases allowing redemption must be addressed with proper reasons. The stated result is quashing of the confiscation order and reconsideration of redemption.

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Issues: (i) Whether the discretion under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 to permit redemption of confiscated goods could be controlled by Board instructions and had to be exercised independently and fairly; (ii) Whether the order of absolute confiscation could stand when the authority departed from prior comparable cases and relied on irrelevant and biased considerations.

Issue (i): Whether the discretion under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 to permit redemption of confiscated goods could be controlled by Board instructions and had to be exercised independently and fairly.

Analysis: Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 confers a discretion on the adjudicating officer to give the owner an option to pay a fine in lieu of confiscation where confiscation is authorised. That discretion is quasi-judicial in character and cannot be dictated by the Central Board of Excise and Customs or any other authority. The power must be exercised fairly, reasonably, and on an independent assessment of the facts, not by mechanically following administrative directions.

Conclusion: The discretion under Section 125 could not be fettered by Board instructions, and the adjudicating authority was bound to exercise it independently.

Issue (ii): Whether the order of absolute confiscation could stand when the authority departed from prior comparable cases and relied on irrelevant and biased considerations.

Analysis: Comparable instances showed that similar imported cars had been allowed to be redeemed on payment of fine, including cases involving gifts and cases where no close relationship was shown. The impugned order proceeded on assumptions about foreign exchange and economic harm that were not supported by the record. Where an authority acts on irrelevant considerations, ignores consistent prior treatment without justification, or appears to have been moved by bias, the resulting order cannot be sustained. The manner in which the matter was shifted from the Deputy Collector to the Collector also reinforced the inference that the discretion was not exercised impartially.

Conclusion: The order of absolute confiscation was unsustainable and had to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The confiscation order was quashed and the matter was directed to be reconsidered by granting the petitioner an option to redeem the car on payment of fine, with release to follow upon payment of the assessed duty and redemption fine.

Ratio Decidendi: A discretionary power under Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 must be exercised independently, fairly, and on relevant considerations, and an order is liable to be set aside if it is influenced by external instructions, arbitrary departure from consistent practice, or irrelevant and biased reasoning.

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