Acquittal interference and customs confiscation presumptions: conviction fails without proof of conscious possession and guilty knowledge.

Interference with an acquittal is justified only when the trial court's view is illegal, perverse, or manifestly unreasonable; where two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court will not substitute its own and the acquittal stands. For a conviction under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, the prosecution must prove conscious possession or dealing with goods knowing, or having reason to believe, that they were liable to confiscation; uncorroborated confession evidence and mere suspicion are insufficient. The presumption under Section 123 did not apply to the seized vehicle because it was not shown to fall within the notified class of goods. The acquittal was left undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the acquittal could be interfered with in appeal on the evidence on record; (ii) Whether the ingredients of Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were proved so as to sustain conviction, and whether the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied to the seized vehicle.

Issue (i): Whether the acquittal could be interfered with in appeal on the evidence on record.

Analysis: Interference with an acquittal is warranted only where the view taken by the acquitting court is illegal, perverse, or manifestly unreasonable. If two reasonable views are possible, the appellate court should not substitute its own view merely because a different conclusion is also possible.

Conclusion: The acquittal did not call for interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the ingredients of Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were proved so as to sustain conviction, and whether the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 applied to the seized vehicle.

Analysis: A conviction under Section 135 requires proof that the accused was in conscious possession of, or was dealing with, goods knowing or having reason to believe that they were liable to confiscation under Section 111. The prosecution failed to prove possession or control by reliable evidence, and the alleged confession was not corroborated on the vital point. Mere suspicion, even if grave, cannot substitute for proof. Section 123 did not apply because vehicles were not shown to have been specified by notification as a class of goods covered by that provision.

Conclusion: The ingredients of Section 135(1)(b) were not established and the Section 123 presumption was inapplicable.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution failed to bring home the charge under the Customs Act, and the respondent's acquittal was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is not justified where the acquitting court's view is reasonably possible, and a conviction under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 requires proof of conscious possession or dealing with the requisite guilty knowledge, which cannot rest on suspicion alone.

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