Civil court jurisdiction barred where termination dispute arises under the Industrial Disputes Act; decree treated as a nullity.

Where a claim for termination-related relief is founded on rights and consequences created by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the civil court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit on merits. The suit in question was based on statutory requirements such as continuous service and protection against termination without compliance with retrenchment conditions, so the dispute fell outside civil court competence. A decree passed by a court without inherent jurisdiction is without legal force, may be treated as coram non judice even at the execution stage, and is unenforceable. The jurisdictional objection was therefore rightly accepted, and the decree was held to be a nullity.

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Issues: Whether a civil suit challenging termination of service and founded on the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was maintainable before the civil court, and whether the decree passed in such suit was a nullity.

Analysis: The suit was expressly based on rights and consequences flowing from the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, including the requirement of continuous service and the statutory protection against termination without compliance with the retrenchment conditions. In such a setting, the civil court could not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on merits. A decree passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction is without legal force and may be treated as coram non judice even at the execution stage.

Conclusion: The civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and the decree passed in favour of the employee was a nullity. The jurisdictional objection was rightly accepted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a claim for relief is founded on rights and consequences created by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the civil court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, and any decree passed therein is void and unenforceable.

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