Limitation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was not extended by COVID orders, and Section 340 inquiry was unwarranted.

The COVID-19 limitation extension did not enlarge the separate statutory condonable period under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, so an appeal filed well beyond the prescribed time remained barred by limitation. An inquiry under Section 340 CrPC was also unwarranted because the alleged forged memorandum of understanding did not form the basis of the adjudication and was not relied upon in the decision. The challenge therefore failed on limitation and on the request for criminal inquiry, and the impugned order remained undisturbed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appeal, filed beyond the statutory period under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, could be saved by the extension of limitation ordered during the COVID-19 period. (ii) Whether an inquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was warranted where the alleged forged document did not form the basis of the adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal, filed beyond the statutory period under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, could be saved by the extension of limitation ordered during the COVID-19 period.

Analysis: The appeal was filed much after the expiry of the prescribed 30-day period, and the delay far exceeded the further condonable period available under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The extension granted in the suo motu limitation orders applied only where limitation had expired on or after the relevant date, and did not enlarge the separate statutory period within which delay could be condoned. The appeal therefore remained barred by limitation.

Conclusion: The delay could not be condoned and the appeal was barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether an inquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was warranted where the alleged forged document did not form the basis of the adjudication.

Analysis: An inquiry under Section 340 is attracted only where the court is called upon to act on a document that has materially influenced its adjudication, and where it is expedient in the interests of justice to initiate proceedings. Since the impugned memorandum of understanding did not form the basis of the adjudication and was not relied upon for the decision, the statutory preconditions for action under Section 340 were absent.

Conclusion: No inquiry under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The challenge failed both on limitation and on merits, and the impugned order was left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: The COVID-19 extension of limitation did not enlarge a separately prescribed condonable period under a special statute, and Section 340 proceedings are not warranted unless the alleged false document formed the basis of the adjudication and action is expedient in the interests of justice.

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