Court upholds Income Tax Act reassessment based on reasonable belief, emphasizing "reason to believe" and disclosure rules.

The court dismissed the writ petition challenging the reopening of the assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act. It held that the Assessing Officer had a reasonable belief based on new materials to invoke Section 147, emphasizing the requirement of "reason to believe" and compliance with the proviso regarding full and true disclosure. The court found that the notice under Section 148 did not need to mention "full and true disclosure" explicitly and that the circulars cited did not invalidate the reopening proceedings. The High Court's interference was deemed unwarranted, allowing the reassessment process to proceed.

---

---

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of reopening assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act.
2. Validity of notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act.
3. Requirement of "reason to believe" for reopening assessment.
4. Compliance with the proviso to Section 147 regarding full and true disclosure.
5. Consideration of Circulars issued by the CBDT.
6. Jurisdiction and scope of High Court's interference under Article 226.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of Reopening Assessment under Section 147:
The petitioner challenged the reopening of the assessment for the year 2007-08, arguing that it was based on a change of opinion and lacked the "reason to believe" as mandated by Section 147. The petitioner contended that the Business Development Commission issue had already been adjudicated in the original assessment order dated 15.12.2010 and by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The court examined the statutory mandate of "reason to believe" and concluded that it must be based on new material or evidence, not mere suspicion. The court emphasized that the Assessing Officer must have a reasonable belief based on certain materials or information to invoke Section 147.

2. Validity of Notice Issued under Section 148:
The petitioner argued that the notice under Section 148 and the subsequent order did not mention "full and true disclosure," which is mandatory under the proviso to Section 147. The court held that mere non-mentioning of the term "full and true disclosure" does not vitiate the proceedings. It emphasized that the sufficiency of reasons for reopening cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings and must be examined by the Assessing Officer.

3. Requirement of "Reason to Believe":
The court analyzed the term "reason to believe" and concluded that it must be based on reasonable and sensible belief, supported by materials or information. The court noted that the Assessing Officer had reasons to believe that income had escaped assessment, as stated in the proceedings dated 11.04.2014. The court held that the belief must be reasonable and result from using the faculty of reason.

4. Compliance with the Proviso to Section 147 Regarding Full and True Disclosure:
The petitioner argued that the case fell beyond four years and within six years, requiring clear terms that the assessee had not made full and true disclosure. The court held that the proviso to Section 147 allows reopening beyond four years if the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The court found that the reasons for reopening, including non-deduction of tax on the Business Development Commission, were sufficient to invoke Section 147.

5. Consideration of Circulars Issued by the CBDT:
The petitioner relied on CBDT Circulars dated 23.07.1969 and 07.02.2000, arguing that the respondents failed to consider them. The court noted that circulars are binding on the Income Tax Department but must be followed in consonance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The court found that the circulars and judgments cited by the petitioner did not invalidate the reopening proceedings.

6. Jurisdiction and Scope of High Court's Interference under Article 226:
The court emphasized that its power under Article 226 is limited to scrutinizing the process, not the decision itself. It held that interference is permissible only if there is no jurisdiction or prima facie case for reopening. The court found that the reasons for reopening were sensible and based on new materials, thus allowing the Assessing Officer to proceed with the assessment.

Conclusion:
The writ petition was dismissed, allowing the respondents to proceed with the reopening of the assessment. The court held that the petitioner could defend its case during the reassessment process, and the High Court's interference at the initiation stage was not warranted. The connected miscellaneous petition was also closed.

---