Judicial immunity for tax assessment orders bars prosecution where the officer acted in a quasi-judicial capacity without extraneous motive.

An Assistant Commissioner passing assessment and refund orders under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act acted in a judicial or at least quasi-judicial capacity, because the process required notice, hearing, and determination of liability on objective material. That brought the officer within the protection of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Section 3(1) was held to protect acts done in discharge of judicial duty, and prosecution could not be founded merely on the assessment orders or on allegations that they were erroneous, caused revenue loss, or were issued under departmental directions. In the absence of material showing extraneous considerations, bribe, or oblique motive, the criminal proceedings were barred and quashed.

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Issues: (i) Whether an Assistant Commissioner passing assessment and refund orders under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 acted as a Judge or quasi-judicial authority so as to attract protection under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985; (ii) Whether the prosecution based solely on such assessment orders was barred by Section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 notwithstanding the allegation of absence of good faith and the existence of departmental directions.

Issue (i): Whether an Assistant Commissioner passing assessment and refund orders under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 acted as a Judge or quasi-judicial authority so as to attract protection under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985

Analysis: The assessment process under the sales tax law required application of objective standards, notice and hearing, and determination of tax liability on the basis of materials on record. Such proceedings were legal proceedings, and the authority empowered to pass definitive orders in them fell within the statutory definition of "Judge". The assessment orders were therefore treated as acts performed in a judicial or at least quasi-judicial capacity.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held to have acted as a Judge within the meaning of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 while passing the assessment orders.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution based solely on such assessment orders was barred by Section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 notwithstanding the allegation of absence of good faith and the existence of departmental directions

Analysis: Protection under Section 3(1) did not depend on good faith in the sense urged by the prosecution. The relevant inquiry was whether the impugned acts were done in the discharge of judicial duty, not whether the orders were erroneous or resulted in loss to the revenue. Directions of a superior officer could not control the independent judgment of a quasi-judicial assessing authority. In the absence of material showing extraneous considerations, bribe, or oblique motive, criminal prosecution could not be founded merely on the assessment orders themselves.

Conclusion: The prosecution was held to be not maintainable and barred by the protection available under Section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.

Final Conclusion: The assessment orders were treated as judicial or quasi-judicial acts protected by law, and the criminal proceedings founded only on those orders were quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory authority empowered to make definitive assessment orders in legal proceedings acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, and criminal prosecution cannot rest merely on the correctness or revenue consequence of such orders unless there is material showing extraneous considerations or abuse of the judicial function.

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