2021 (5) TMI 932 - HC - Customs

Malicious prosecution suit deemed maintainable under Limitation Act 1963

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence & Ors. Versus Puspha L. Tolani

The Court held that the suit for malicious prosecution was filed within the limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. The arguments that ... Time Limitation period for filing a suit for malicious prosecution, against the customs authorities/officials - Section 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- A reading of Section 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, shows that the earlier Section (in the Sea Customs Act, 1878), has simply been merged and set out in continuity. The side headings of the provision have also been omitted. A cause for confusion has thus arisen, leading to varying interpretations of this provision by different Courts - A perusal of the provisions of The Limitation Act, 1963, shows that the period of limitation for filing of a suit for malicious prosecution is one year, from the date when the Plaintiff is acquitted or when the prosecution against the Plaintiff is otherwise terminated. In the present case, the Plaintiff was acquitted on 11th April 2007. Parallelly, however, show-cause proceedings were commenced against the Petitioner and the show-cause notice, issued by the Customs Authorities, was quashed on 13th September, 2006. The quashing of the said show-cause notice was upheld by the ld. Supreme Court on 18th August, 2017. Considering the fact that the show-cause notice had also raised issues which were overlapping in nature, it is possible to take a view that until and unless this show cause notice finally terminated, with the judgment of the Supreme Court, the limitation does not begin for the Plaintiff to avail her remedy to file a civil suit - In the present case, however, the Court need not even venture so far. The date of the acquittal of the Plaintiff/Respondent is 11th April 2007 and the suit for malicious prosecution was instituted by her on 11th April 2008. As per Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, the date from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, is to be excluded while calculating the said period. This would clearly mean that the date, as on which the order of acquittal of the Plaintiff was pronounced by the ld. Sessions Judge, would have to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the limitation of one year for filing of the suit for malicious prosecution. Thus, the limitation, under Section 3 of the Limitation Act r/w Entry 74 of the Schedule would commence only on 12th April 2008. The suit for malicious prosecution in the present case, having been filed on 11th April 2008 which is within the period of one year, is therefore well within the limitation prescribed under The Limitation Act, 1963. This court is of the opinion that the suit is well within limitation, as the period of limitation under Section 3 and Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1962, r/w Entry 74 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, would have ended only on 12th April 2008, which is one day after the date when the suit for malicious prosecution was presented by the Plaintiff/Respondent. The suit is thus within limitation. Petition dismissed. Issues Involved:1. Limitation period for filing a suit for malicious prosecution under the Customs Act, 1962.2. Applicability of Section 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 to suits.3. Calculation of limitation period under the Limitation Act, 1963.Detailed Analysis:Issue 1: Limitation Period for Filing a Suit for Malicious Prosecution Under the Customs Act, 1962The primary question was the limitation period for filing a suit for malicious prosecution against customs authorities/officials under the Customs Act, 1962. The Plaintiff was intercepted and arrested by customs authorities on 19th November 2002, and later acquitted on 11th April 2007. The suit for malicious prosecution was filed on 11th April 2008. The Defendants argued that the suit was barred by limitation under Section 155(2) of the Customs Act, which prescribes a three-month period from the accrual of the cause of action. The Plaintiff contended that the suit was within the limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows one year from the date of acquittal.Issue 2: Applicability of Section 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 to SuitsSection 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, was scrutinized to determine if it applies to suits. The provision reads: 'No proceeding other than a suit shall be commenced against the Central Government or any officer of the Government or a local authority for anything purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act without giving the Central Government or such officer a month’s previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding and of the cause thereof, or after the expiration of three months from the accrual of such cause.' The Court concluded that Section 155(2) does not apply to suits but to other proceedings. This interpretation was supported by precedents from the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and judgments from the Madras and Kerala High Courts, which clarified that the limitation and notice requirements under Section 155(2) are not applicable to suits.Issue 3: Calculation of Limitation Period Under the Limitation Act, 1963The Court then examined the limitation period under the Limitation Act, 1963. According to Section 3, read with Entry 74 of the Schedule, the limitation period for filing a suit for malicious prosecution is one year from the date of acquittal or termination of prosecution. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act specifies that the day from which the period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Since the Plaintiff was acquitted on 11th April 2007, the limitation period commenced on 12th April 2007, making the last day to file the suit 11th April 2008. The Plaintiff filed the suit on 11th April 2008, thus within the one-year limitation period.Conclusion:The Court held that the suit for malicious prosecution was filed within the limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. The arguments that the suit was barred by Section 155(2) of the Customs Act were rejected, as this provision does not apply to suits. Therefore, the suit was deemed maintainable, and the petition challenging the Trial Court's decision was dismissed. The Trial Court was directed to expedite the suit's adjudication.