Entertainment tax exemption extends to a lessee in charge where the statute's inclusive definition prevails over policy.

An exemption from entertainment tax under the relevant notification was interpreted by reference to the parent statute because neither the notification nor the contemporaneous policy defined "proprietor." The court applied the inclusive definition in the M.P. Entertainment Duty and Advertisement Tax Act, 1936, which covers a person responsible for or in charge of management of the entertainment, and treated that expression as wide enough to include a lessee actually running the multiplex and paying duty. It further noted that executive policy cannot override the statute, and that refusal based on a reason not found in the exemption order was unsustainable.

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Issues: Whether the exemption from entertainment tax under the relevant notification and policy was confined only to the owner/applicant of the multiplex or extended to a lessee in control and management of the entertainment, and whether the impugned refusal order could stand.

Analysis: The exemption notification was issued under the enabling power in Section 7 of the M.P. Entertainment Duty and Advertisement Tax Act, 1936, while the policy issued on the same date was only an executive instruction. Neither instrument defined proprietor, so the meaning had to be taken from Section 2(f) of the Act, which contains an inclusive definition covering any person responsible for or in charge of management of the entertainment. On that footing, the statutory expression was wide enough to include a lessee who actually ran the multiplex and paid the entertainment duty. The Court also held that executive policy could not override the parent statute, and the impugned order was bad because it was founded on a ground not reflected in the exemption order itself.

Conclusion: The benefit of exemption was not confined to the owner and extended to the lessee; the refusal order was unsustainable and was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the parent taxing statute contains an inclusive definition of the person liable or eligible in relation to an entertainment, that definition prevails over an executive policy, and the exemption must be granted to the person who answers that statutory description, including a lessee in charge of the entertainment.

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