Dismissal of Petition Challenging Self-Cheque for Time-Barred Debt

The court dismissed the petition challenging the issuance of a self-cheque for a time-barred debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It held that the determination of whether the debt is time-barred requires a full trial and cannot be decided at the preliminary stage. The court also ruled that a self-cheque without endorsement can attract Section 138 if the respondent is a holder in due course. The errors alleged in taking cognizance by the Magistrate and Revisional Court were found to be unfounded, leading to the dismissal of the petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the issuance of a self-cheque in respect of a time-barred debt can be quashed.
2. Whether the self-cheque issued by the petitioner attracts Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
3. Whether both the Magistrate and the Revisional Court committed an error in taking cognizance and confirming the cognizance, requiring interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Issuance of Self-Cheque in Respect of Time-Barred Debt
The petitioner argued that the issuance of a self-cheque for a time-barred debt does not constitute a valid acknowledgment of liability and should not attract criminal liability under Section 138 of the NI Act. The petitioner contended that the transaction occurred four years prior, making it barred by limitation, and that issuing a self-cheque does not revive the debt. The petitioner relied on several judgments, including those from the Apex Court and various High Courts, to support this argument.

The Court, however, referred to the Apex Court's judgment in S. Natarajan's case, which held that whether a debt is time-barred involves a mixed question of law and fact that can only be decided after evidence is adduced. It was emphasized that the burden of proving the non-existence of any debt or liability is on the accused, to be discharged at trial. Therefore, the Court concluded that the issue of whether the transaction is time-barred cannot be determined at the preliminary stage of taking cognizance and dismissed the argument for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

Issue 2: Self-Cheque and Section 138 of the NI Act
The petitioner contended that a self-cheque without endorsement does not attract Section 138 of the NI Act. The petitioner relied on judgments, including the Gauhati High Court's decision in Dr. Jiten Barkakoti v. Subrata Patangia, which suggested that dishonor of a self-drawn cheque does not constitute a penal offense.

Contrarily, the respondent's counsel argued that the cheque, which was not marked "bearer," made the respondent a holder in due course, thus attracting Section 138 of the NI Act. The Court referred to multiple judgments, including those from the Karnataka High Court in B. Sarvothama's case and the Delhi High Court in Adigear International's case, which supported the view that a bearer cheque, if dishonored, would attract the rigors of Section 138 of the NI Act. The Court concluded that the self-cheque issued by the petitioner does attract Section 138 of the NI Act, as the respondent was a holder in due course.

Issue 3: Error in Taking Cognizance by Magistrate and Revisional Court
The petitioner argued that the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance and that the Revisional Court also committed an error in confirming this cognizance. The petitioner emphasized that the debt was time-barred and that the self-cheque did not attract Section 138 of the NI Act.

The Court, however, noted that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance based on the material available on record. The Revisional Court had also correctly observed that the scope of revision is limited and that the merits of the case cannot be decided in a revision petition. The Revisional Court had found that the petitioner admitted to issuing two self-cheques, and the word "bearer" had not been struck off, making the respondent a holder in due course. The Court concluded that the matter requires a full-fledged trial to decide the issues involved and that the grounds urged by the petitioner can be raised during the trial. Thus, there was no merit in the petition for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

Order:
The petition is dismissed.

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