Presumption of legally enforceable debt under cheque law upheld; revision declined absent perversity or miscarriage of justice.

A cheque attracts a presumption of consideration, and the accused must rebut the existence of a legally enforceable debt with credible material on a preponderance of probabilities; a mere denial or the complainant's failure to produce books of accounts is insufficient. Applying this principle, the record supported the finding that the cheques were issued towards repayment of liability, so the statutory presumption remained intact. Revisional interference was also unwarranted because revision is supervisory and not a forum for reappreciation of evidence absent perversity, illegality, or miscarriage of justice. The conviction and sentence were therefore sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the respondent's failure to produce books of accounts rebutted the statutory presumption and showed that the cheque amounts were not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. (ii) Whether interference in revision was warranted with the concurrent findings convicting the petitioner under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent's failure to produce books of accounts rebutted the statutory presumption and showed that the cheque amounts were not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: A cheque carries a presumption of consideration, and the initial burden lies on the accused to displace the existence of debt by proving non-existence of liability on a preponderance of probabilities. Mere denial, without supporting material, is insufficient. The record showed that the petitioner admitted financial assistance from the respondent, while the surrounding evidence supported the finding that the cheques were issued towards repayment of liability. The absence of the respondent's books of accounts did not by itself demolish the statutory presumption or absolve the petitioner from rebutting it with credible material.

Conclusion: The statutory presumption was not rebutted, and the existence of a legally enforceable debt remained proved against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether interference in revision was warranted with the concurrent findings convicting the petitioner under the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and is not meant for reappreciation of evidence as in an appeal. Interference is justified only where there is glaring illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice. The findings of the courts below were based on appreciation of the evidence and were not shown to be perverse or unsupported by the record. No exceptional ground existed to disturb the conviction or sentence in revision.

Conclusion: No revisional interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were allowed to stand, and the revision failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the accused must rebut the presumption of consideration and legally enforceable liability with credible material, and a revision court will not disturb concurrent findings unless they are perverse or cause miscarriage of justice.

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