2002 (9) TMI 102 - SC - Income Tax

Supreme Court Revives Writ Petitions, Directs Fresh Hearing

S. Shanmugavel Nadar Versus State Of Tamil Nadu And Another

S. Shanmugavel Nadar Versus State Of Tamil Nadu And Another - [2003] 263 ITR 658, 185 CTR 593, [2003] 132 STC 284 (SC), 2002 (8) SCC 361, 2002 (7) JT 568 Issues Involved:1. Constitutional validity of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996).2. Application of the doctrine of merger.3. Interpretation and application of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.4. Precedential value of the Division Bench decision in M. Varadaraja Pillai's case [1972] 85 Mad LW 760.5. Jurisdiction and competence of the Full Bench to review the decision of the Division Bench.Detailed Analysis:1. Constitutional Validity of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996):The Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994, was enacted by the State Legislature and came into force on January 11, 1996. Its constitutional validity was challenged through several writ petitions in the High Court. The High Court's Division Bench referred to the precedent set in M. Varadaraja Pillai's case [1972] 85 Mad LW 760, which upheld the constitutional validity of an earlier amendment (Act No. 13 of 1960). The Full Bench, however, was tasked with reconsidering the correctness of this precedent.2. Application of the Doctrine of Merger:The Supreme Court clarified that the doctrine of merger has limited application. It stated that the doctrine does not universally apply to all orders and judgments. Specifically, the Court noted that the doctrine of merger applies primarily to the operative part of the order and not necessarily to the reasoning behind it. The Supreme Court cited several cases, including State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86, and State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681, to emphasize that the application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the jurisdiction.3. Interpretation and Application of Article 141 of the Constitution of India:Article 141 of the Constitution states that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The Supreme Court held that for a declaration of law, there must be a speaking order. It reiterated that a summary dismissal without laying down any law does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141. The Court referred to cases like Krishena Kumar v. Union of India [1990] 4 SCC 207 and State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [1991] 4 SCC 139 to support this interpretation.4. Precedential Value of the Division Bench Decision in M. Varadaraja Pillai's Case [1972] 85 Mad LW 760:The Supreme Court held that the decision in M. Varadaraja Pillai's case, although cited as a precedent, was not res judicata. The Court clarified that the earlier dismissal of appeals on technical grounds did not affirm the reasoning or the law laid down by the Division Bench in that case. Therefore, the Full Bench was not precluded from re-examining the correctness of the law stated in M. Varadaraja Pillai's case.5. Jurisdiction and Competence of the Full Bench to Review the Decision of the Division Bench:The Supreme Court stated that the Full Bench was competent to review the decision of the Division Bench in M. Varadaraja Pillai's case. The Full Bench was not dealing with a review application but was reconsidering the precedent set by the Division Bench. The Court emphasized that the Full Bench should not feel inhibited by the earlier dismissal of appeals by the Supreme Court, as those dismissals were based on technical grounds without any declaration of law.Conclusion:The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Full Bench, and restored the appeals before the Full Bench of the High Court for a fresh hearing. The Full Bench was directed to hear and decide all the controversies arising in the writ petitions, including the constitutional validity of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994, without being influenced by the earlier dismissal of appeals by the Supreme Court. The Court also restored all interim orders passed by the High Court and allowed the High Court to reconsider them if necessary. The hearing before the Full Bench was to be expedited due to the large number of cases affected by the decision.