Raw petroleum coke allocation turns on capacity certificates, not a same-day consent to operate, and the quota decision was sustained.
The allocation scheme for raw petroleum coke was construed to permit the DGFT to assess claimed production capacity on the materials before it, because earlier Supreme Court orders only fixed an outer import ceiling and did not determine unit-wise quota entitlement. The public notice was read as distinguishing between a State Pollution Control Board certificate evidencing capacity as on 09.10.2018 and the consent to operate, so the consent was not required to bear the same date as the capacity certificate. The allocation was also not shown to be invalid for want of application of mind, since the authority relied on the certificate and the certificate itself was not directly challenged. The challenge to the quota decision failed.
Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's earlier orders barred consideration of the additional production capacity claimed by the calciner unit for allocation of raw petroleum coke. (ii) Whether, under the public notice governing allocation, a State Pollution Control Board certificate indicating capacity as on 09.10.2018 could be relied upon even if the consent to operate was not granted on that exact date. (iii) Whether the allocation in favour of the calciner unit was vitiated for want of application of mind or for reliance on an unchallenged certificate.
Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's earlier orders barred consideration of the additional production capacity claimed by the calciner unit for allocation of raw petroleum coke.
Analysis: The earlier orders only fixed an outer limit for import of raw petroleum coke and rejected prayers seeking enhancement of that ceiling. They did not determine the installed capacity of the individual units or their inter se entitlement to quota. The allocation exercise remained within the domain of the DGFT, and the later administrative decisions could therefore examine the relevant production capacity on the basis of the materials placed before it.
Conclusion: The earlier Supreme Court orders did not prohibit consideration of the claimed production capacity for quota allocation.
Issue (ii): Whether, under the public notice governing allocation, a State Pollution Control Board certificate indicating capacity as on 09.10.2018 could be relied upon even if the consent to operate was not granted on that exact date.
Analysis: The public notice drew a distinction between the certificate evidencing capacity as on 09.10.2018 and the consent to operate. The former had to reflect capacity on the specified date, while the latter was not made subject to the same cut-off. The Court also noted the statutory relevance of consent from the State Pollution Control Board under the Air and Water pollution control enactments, but held that the text of the public notice did not require the consent itself to bear the same date as the capacity certificate.
Conclusion: The public notice permitted reliance on the State Pollution Control Board certificate of capacity as on 09.10.2018, and did not require the consent to operate to be granted on that date.
Issue (iii): Whether the allocation in favour of the calciner unit was vitiated for want of application of mind or for reliance on an unchallenged certificate.
Analysis: The decision-making file showed that the authority relied on the certificate issued by the State Pollution Control Board and followed the allocation criteria stated in the public notice. The certificate itself was not challenged, and the issuing authority was not brought before the Court for a direct adjudication on its validity. In those circumstances, the allocation could not be struck down on the basis urged by the petitioners.
Conclusion: The allocation was not shown to be vitiated for want of application of mind or on the ground of the unchallenged certificate.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the allocation of raw petroleum coke failed, and the impugned quota decision was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an allocation scheme expressly distinguishes between a capacity certificate and consent to operate, the authority may act on the certificate if it satisfies the stated cut-off condition, and an unchallenged certificate cannot be invalidated collaterally in the absence of a direct challenge to its source or issuer.