'Used' in Section 3 requires present factual use for industrial or commercial assessment; broader interpretation impermissible

The SC allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment insofar as it interpreted the word "used" in section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963. The Court held that assessment at the rate for industrial (or commercial/other non-agricultural) land requires a factual finding that the land is presently in use for that purpose; a broader construction of "used" is impermissible. As a taxing statute, the Act must be construed according to the clear language employed, and courts may not impute an unexpressed legislative intent.

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Issues:
Interpretation of the word "used" in the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963.

Analysis:
The judgment in question dealt with the interpretation of the term "used" in the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963. The issue arose from a previous decision by a Bench of five judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which interpreted "used" to include lands "meant to be used" or "set apart for being used" for non-agricultural purposes. This interpretation was challenged in the appeals by industries in Andhra Pradesh and their Federation. The Act defined "industrial purpose" and "non-agricultural land" and specified rates of assessment based on land usage for different purposes.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court had previously held that the term "used" in the Act had a wider meaning, encompassing lands designated for future industrial or commercial use. However, a subsequent Bench of two judges sought a reconsideration of this interpretation, leading to the matter being heard by a Bench of five judges. The latter upheld the broader interpretation, stating that non-agricultural lands intended for industrial use were also subject to assessment under the Act. The judges rejected the argument that fiscal legislation should be strictly interpreted in favor of the assessee, emphasizing the legislative intent behind the Act.

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a strict construction of taxing statutes, citing precedents that cautioned against reading additional meanings into such laws. The Court reiterated that only land currently in use for industrial purposes, as defined by the Act, could be assessed accordingly. The broader interpretation of "used" was deemed untenable, as it went against the principles of interpreting taxing statutes. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, setting aside the previous judgment's interpretation of the term "used" in section 3 of the Act.

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