Delay in writ proceedings is not a rigid bar where explanation is convincing and no statutory limitation applies.

Delay alone was not a rigid bar to a writ petition where no statutory limitation period applied. In proceedings under land ceiling legislation, delay had to be assessed in light of the nature of the matter, the explanation offered, and the time taken in departmental decision-making before approaching the court. The principle against stale claims was only a rule of judicial circumspection, not a fixed limitation rule. As the explanation for delay was found convincing, the High Court erred in refusing to examine the petition on merits, and the matter had to be heard substantively.

---

---

Issues: Whether the writ petition could be dismissed solely on the ground of delay and whether the High Court ought to have examined the matter on merits.

Analysis: No statutory period of limitation governed the writ petition. Delay in approaching the Court in proceedings arising under land ceiling legislation had to be assessed with due regard to the nature of the proceedings, the explanation offered for the delay, and the possibility that departmental decision-making may take time before a matter is carried to the higher court. The principle that stale claims should not ordinarily be entertained is one of judicial circumspection and not a rigid rule of limitation. On the facts, the explanation for delay was found to be convincing and the High Court erred in refusing to consider the petition on merits merely because of delay.

Conclusion: The dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay was not justified, and the matter had to be heard on merits.

---