Summons-case procedure limits discharge and document production requests; accused cannot recall process or use Section 91 at the initial stage.

In a summons-case prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, Chapter XX of the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for discharge or recall of summons after process is issued; the proper course is to proceed with plea recording and trial, with inherent High Court jurisdiction as the available corrective remedy where justified. The accused therefore had no right to have the summons withdrawn by the trial court. Section 91 CrPC also cannot be used at the initial stage to compel production of documents for defence purposes, because document production depends on the court's satisfaction that it is necessary or desirable at the relevant stage and cannot be sought through a roving inquiry. The refusal to discharge and to order production was upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether an accused facing prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be discharged or summoned process recalled in a summons case; (ii) Whether the accused can invoke Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to seek production of documents at the initial stage of the proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether an accused facing prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be discharged or summoned process recalled in a summons case.

Analysis: Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 governing summons cases does not contemplate discharge. Once the accused is summoned, the procedure is to state the particulars of the offence, record the plea, receive evidence, and then proceed to acquittal or conviction. The remedy against an order issuing process is not discharge before the trial court, but recourse to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court where warranted. The legal position recognised in the authorities relied upon is that recall or review of summons is not contemplated in a summons case once process has been issued.

Conclusion: The accused could not be discharged, and the summons already issued could not be recalled by the trial court; the rejection of the discharge application was justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused can invoke Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to seek production of documents at the initial stage of the proceedings.

Analysis: Section 91 empowers the Court to summon documents when their production is necessary or desirable for investigation, inquiry, trial, or other proceedings, but the necessity must be assessed with reference to the stage of the case. At the initial stage, an accused does not have an unfettered right to compel production of documents to establish the defence, and the law does not permit a roving or fishing inquiry. The cited authorities also affirm that the defence cannot insist on production of documents outside the court's satisfaction and outside the stage where such material becomes relevant.

Conclusion: The application for production of documents at the initial stage was rightly rejected.

Final Conclusion: The petitions failed on both grounds, and the orders of the courts below refusing discharge and refusing production of documents were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a summons-case prosecution, there is no provision for discharge or recall of summons once process is issued, and the accused cannot invoke Section 91 to compel production of documents at the initial stage for the purpose of defence.

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