Government premises definition excludes bare land, so special eviction proceedings under the tenancy law are unavailable.
A corporation under State control may qualify as a Government undertaking where it is incorporated under the Companies Act and substantially owned by the State. However, bare land leased by such an undertaking does not, by itself, fall within the statutory definition of Government premises, because the definition of premises covers buildings and appurtenant structures, not vacant land. As a result, the special eviction machinery under the Act is unavailable for bare land, and eviction must instead proceed under the public land eviction law.
Issues: (i) Whether the Corporation was a Government undertaking within the meaning of the Act; (ii) whether bare land leased by the Corporation, without any structure standing thereon, constituted Government premises under the Act; (iii) whether eviction proceedings under the Act were maintainable.
Issue (i): Whether the Corporation was a Government undertaking within the meaning of the Act.
Analysis: The Corporation was a body corporate incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, under the administrative control of the State Government, with the State holding substantially all its shares. It functioned as an instrumentality owned and controlled by the State in relation to industrial development activities.
Conclusion: Yes. The Corporation was a Government undertaking within the meaning of the Act.
Issue (ii): Whether bare land leased by the Corporation, without any structure standing thereon, constituted Government premises under the Act.
Analysis: The definition of Government premises had to be read with the definition of premises. That combined reading covered buildings, huts, parts thereof, seats in rooms, and appurtenant gardens, grounds, outhouses, furniture, fittings and fixtures. Bare land was not independently included within the statutory definition of premises. Where the land let out remained only bare land at the time eviction proceedings were initiated, it did not answer the statutory description of Government premises.
Conclusion: No. Bare land without any structure did not constitute Government premises under the Act.
Issue (iii): Whether eviction proceedings under the Act were maintainable.
Analysis: The plots in question were admittedly bare land when the eviction proceedings were initiated. Since the statutory foundation of Government premises was absent, the special eviction machinery under the Act could not be invoked against the lessee in respect of those plots. The proper course lay under the public land eviction law.
Conclusion: No. The eviction proceedings under the Act were without jurisdiction and not maintainable.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the Corporation, though a Government undertaking, could not invoke the special tenancy statute against bare land that did not fall within the definition of Government premises; eviction had to be pursued under the public land eviction statute.
Ratio Decidendi: Bare land let out by a Government undertaking, where no structure exists at the time eviction proceedings are initiated, does not fall within the statutory definition of Government premises and cannot be evicted under the special tenancy law.