Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the excise-duty demand where the relevant facts and records had been made available during audit.

Analysis: The demand covered April 2011 to November 2013, while the audit had issued a deficiency memo on 10.03.2014 based on the assessee's records. The show-cause notice was issued only on 13.04.2016 by invoking the extended period. Availability of the material records to audit did not establish suppression or any conduct justifying invocation of the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the demand raised by its invocation was time-barred and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the additional input tax credit benefit was fully passed on to eligible homebuyers; (ii) whether free additional construction work could substitute commensurate reduction in prices; (iii) whether interest was payable on the unpassed benefit; and (iv) whether penalty was attracted for the contravention.

Issue (i): Whether the additional input tax credit benefit was fully passed on to eligible homebuyers.

Analysis: Section 171(1) requires the benefit of additional input tax credit to reach each recipient through a commensurate reduction in price. The supplementary verification accepted that the benefit had been passed to four homebuyers, but determined a remaining differential amount of Rs. 99,435 for two homebuyers. The revised computation and supporting material disclosed no factual or legal infirmity.

Conclusion: The Respondent failed to pass on Rs. 99,435 of the additional input tax credit benefit to the concerned homebuyers, contrary to Section 171(1), in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether free additional construction work could substitute commensurate reduction in prices.

Analysis: The statutory mode of passing on tax or input tax credit benefit is commensurate reduction in price. An equivalent commercial advantage, including free additional construction work, does not fulfil that prescribed mode even where its asserted value exceeds the differential benefit.

Conclusion: Free additional construction work is not valid compliance with the obligation to pass on input tax credit benefit through commensurate reduction in prices, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether interest was payable on the unpassed benefit.

Analysis: Rule 133(3)(b) mandates interest where an amount has not been passed on by commensurate reduction in prices. The affected recipients were deprived of the monetary benefit from the dates on which the higher amounts were collected.

Conclusion: Interest at 18% per annum is payable on the differential profiteered amount from collection of the higher amount until actual payment, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty was attracted for the contravention.

Analysis: The contravention continued after Section 171(3A) came into force on 01.01.2020. The statutory proviso preserves the consequence that no penalty is leviable if the profiteered amount is deposited within thirty days of the order.

Conclusion: The Respondent is liable to penalty under Section 171(3A), in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The remaining input tax credit benefit must be passed to the affected recipients with statutory interest, and the contravention attracts the applicable anti-profiteering penalty regime.

Ratio Decidendi: The benefit of additional input tax credit under Section 171 must be transmitted to each recipient by commensurate reduction in price and cannot be replaced by in-kind or other commercial benefits.

Issues: (i) Whether the Inland Container Depot is a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; (ii) Whether a Reach Stacker used within the Inland Container Depot is a motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issue (i): Whether the Inland Container Depot is a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Analysis: A public place requires a right of access vested in the public. The Inland Container Depot is a customs bonded area where ingress and egress are controlled and access is confined to duly authorised persons. Its specially designed internal roads, used for movement of heavy machinery and containers, are not places to which members of the public can claim entry as of right.

Conclusion: The Inland Container Depot and its internal roads are not a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This conclusion is against the claimant.

Issue (ii): Whether a Reach Stacker used within the Inland Container Depot is a motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Analysis: The requirement that a mechanically propelled vehicle be adapted for use upon roads entails its suitability and dominant utility for ordinary roads. The Reach Stacker substantially exceeds prescribed road-weight limits, is transported in dismantled form, lacks ordinary road-safety features, and operates on specially reinforced internal roads for limited container-handling functions. Though wheeled and mechanically propelled, it is a special-purpose vehicle adapted only for use in enclosed premises and falls within the statutory exclusion. Its non-registration is consistent with this classification, since registration is required only for a motor vehicle.

Conclusion: A Reach Stacker of this nature is excluded from the definition of motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be maintained in respect of the accident involving the Reach Stacker within the restricted Inland Container Depot; the clarification preserves claims involving regular road-going vehicles entering that area.

Ratio Decidendi: A special-purpose mechanically propelled vehicle whose dominant use is confined to enclosed premises and which is not suitable for ordinary public roads is excluded from the statutory definition of a motor vehicle, notwithstanding its wheels and mechanical propulsion.

Issues: Whether a person required to furnish information in an ongoing SFIO investigation has an enforceable right at the preliminary stage to obtain the Central Government's investigation orders and the material underlying those orders.

Analysis: The notice under Section 217 disclosed that the information was sought in connection with an investigation into identified companies and because of the petitioner's financial transactions with them, and specified the categories of records required. The investigation was ongoing, involved multiple entities, and the investigation orders and underlying material contained sensitive information. Disclosure at that stage could prejudice the wider investigation and connected proceedings. No prejudicial action against the petitioner had yet reached a stage warranting disclosure or invocation of remedies based on natural justice.

Conclusion: The petitioner had no enforceable right to disclosure of the investigation orders or underlying material at the preliminary stage; it may pursue remedies available in law if prejudicial action is taken subsequently.

Issues: (i) Whether recovery of central excise duty by invocation of the extended limitation period was sustainable; (ii) Whether Nicotine Sulphate was classifiable under CTH 24039990 or CTH 29399900; (iii) Whether the manufacturer and purchaser were related parties for valuation of the goods supplied to the purchaser.

Issue (i): Whether recovery of central excise duty by invocation of the extended limitation period was sustainable.

Analysis: The manufacturer had informed the department of manufacture and classification of Nicotine Sulphate under Chapter 29 and had consistently disclosed the disputed classification in monthly ER-1 returns. The disclosed material did not support an allegation of suppression or misstatement necessary to invoke the extended period.

Conclusion: The demand for June 2015 to June 2017 issued by invoking the extended limitation period was barred by limitation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Nicotine Sulphate was classifiable under CTH 24039990 or CTH 29399900.

Analysis: The manufacturing process showed that the product was a vegetable alkaloid. Heading 29.39 covers alkaloids and their derivatives, and the Chapter 29 restriction concerning separately chemically defined compounds did not exclude this product because alkaloids are an identified exception under the HSN general notes. The report relied on by Revenue concerned a sample drawn from a third-party premises without the manufacturer's representative, tested more than a year after drawal contrary to the prescribed sampling standard, and included a classification opinion beyond the chemical examiner's analytical role. Factory samples tested subsequently described the product as an aqueous solution of Nicotine Sulphate and an organic chemical.

Conclusion: Nicotine Sulphate was correctly classifiable under CTH 29399900 and not under CTH 24039990; the consequential duty, interest and penalty were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the manufacturer and purchaser were related parties for valuation of the goods supplied to the purchaser.

Analysis: The allegation of related-party status rested on one individual being a partner of the manufacturer and managing director of the purchaser. No supporting evidence established that the entities satisfied the statutory requirements of related persons. The valuation demand based on 110% of cost of production consequently lacked foundation.

Conclusion: The entities were not established to be related parties; the differential duty, interest and penalty on this count were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The extended-period demand and the related-party valuation demand fail, while the declared Chapter 29 classification of Nicotine Sulphate prevails.

Ratio Decidendi: A disclosed tariff classification cannot attract the extended limitation period absent suppression, and Nicotine Sulphate, as a vegetable alkaloid derivative, falls under the alkaloid heading notwithstanding the general requirement of separate chemical definition in Chapter 29.

Issues: (i) Whether acquittal in proceedings for dishonour of cheque bars the civil suit through issue estoppel or res judicata; (ii) Whether the plaintiff proved voluntary execution and delivery of the cheque so as to establish the transaction and attract statutory presumptions.

Issue (i): Whether acquittal in proceedings for dishonour of cheque bars the civil suit through issue estoppel or res judicata.

Analysis: Findings in criminal proceedings were not relevant or binding in the civil suit. Criminal prosecution requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the civil claim is determined on a preponderance of probabilities. An acquittal may only establish failure to prove criminal guilt and does not establish that debt or civil liability has been disproved. The civil court must independently assess the evidence, even where the cheque, witnesses and material overlap.

Conclusion: The acquittal did not create issue estoppel or res judicata and did not bar the civil suit; this issue was against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the plaintiff proved voluntary execution and delivery of the cheque so as to establish the transaction and attract statutory presumptions.

Analysis: Proof that the signature on a cheque belongs to the defendant is distinct from proof that the cheque was voluntarily executed and delivered as an operative instrument. Since execution was specifically denied, the plaintiff had the initial burden to establish voluntary execution before relying on statutory presumptions. The evidence did not satisfactorily prove the circumstances of delivery or execution: the material witness's account concerning payment, completion and delivery of the cheque was materially inconsistent. The trial court's inferences concerning the alleged borrowing were founded on surmise rather than evidence.

Conclusion: The plaintiff failed to prove voluntary execution and delivery of the cheque or the alleged transaction; consequently, the statutory presumptions did not arise. This issue was in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The civil money claim founded on the cheque could not be sustained because its execution and the underlying transaction were not established.

Ratio Decidendi: Where execution of a cheque is specifically denied, proof of the drawer's signature alone does not invoke presumptions of consideration and liability; the claimant must first prove voluntary execution and delivery of the cheque as an operative instrument.

Issues: Whether goods detained in transit, where the petitioner claims ownership, must be released under Section 129(1)(a) rather than Section 129(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 129 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governs release of detained goods and conveyances. The applicable precedent established that, where the person seeking release is the owner of the goods, the release mechanism under Section 129(1)(a) applies; valuation cannot be enhanced for this purpose, and the penalty is to be determined with reference to the invoice and e-way bill. The record disclosed no basis to depart from that position.

Conclusion: The goods are required to be released under Section 129(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a notice and demand order under the GST law issued in the name of a deceased proprietorship taxpayer are valid.

Analysis: Section 74(1) authorises issuance of notice to the person chargeable with tax, while an individual proprietor falls within the definition of "person" under Section 2(84). The taxpayer had died before issuance of both the notice and the consequential demand order, and this factual position was undisputed. The proceedings were thus initiated and concluded against a person who was no longer in existence.

Conclusion: The notice and demand order issued against the deceased taxpayer were without jurisdiction and void; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a demand of tax, interest and penalty exceeding the amount specified in the show-cause notice could be sustained.

Analysis: Section 75(7) prohibits a demand in the adjudication order from exceeding the amount specified in the notice and prohibits confirmation on grounds other than those stated in the notice. The notice specified a composite proposed demand of Rs. 78,059.50, whereas the impugned order raised Rs. 8,63,486.24 towards tax, interest and penalty. The demand was therefore ex facie beyond the notice.

Conclusion: The demand order was invalid for contravention of Section 75(7) and was set aside.

Issues: Whether prosecutions for wilful failure to furnish returns pursuant to search-assessment notices could be quashed under inherent jurisdiction when the alleged non-supply of seized material and the existence of wilful default were disputed factual matters.

Analysis: The alleged requests for search and seizure material, their receipt by the Department, supply of the material to the authorised representative, and the petitioner's ability and intention to furnish returns within the stipulated period were contested. The record did not prima facie establish that a request for the material had been made before expiry of the period prescribed in the notice. Inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to evaluate disputed evidence, determine the accused's factual defence, or decide the existence of wilful default or mens rea; those matters require adjudication on evidence at trial.

Conclusion: Quashing was not warranted; the disputed factual defences concerning wilful failure to file returns must be determined by the Trial Court.

Issues: Whether the dismissed writ petition should be restored to enable a challenge to Section 147-A and the reassessment proceedings.

Outcome: The review application was allowed, the earlier dismissal was set aside, and the writ petition was restored with liberty to amend; reassessment proceedings were stayed during its pendency.

Issues: Whether consequential corrections in the GST returns for Financial Year 2017-18 could be permitted after amendment of the export shipping bills and corresponding corrections in GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B.

Analysis: The original grievance concerning amendment of the shipping bills and correction of GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B stood redressed under the earlier orders. On the peculiar facts, including the delayed issuance of Customs amendment certificates, the parties agreed that consequential corrections in the GST returns should be allowed, without restricting the respondents' power to assess, verify or scrutinise the amendments independently.

Conclusion: The petitioner was permitted to rectify the short reflection in GSTR-3B, reconcile the consequential GSTR-3B and GSTR-2A mismatch, and amend GSTR-9 for Financial Year 2017-18. Any consequential proceedings shall be decided on their merits and not rejected solely on limitation.

Issues: Whether the challenge to the second demand-cum-show cause notice and the resulting assessment order should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite an available statutory appeal.

Analysis: The question whether the later proceedings were founded on material already available during the earlier audit requires factual and legal examination. That examination falls within the statutory jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority, and the assessment order is amenable to appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The writ challenge was not entertained; the petitioner may pursue the statutory appeal.

Issues: Whether a statutory pre-deposit under Section 112(8) is required for admission of an appeal concerning only penalty, where the show-cause notice and impugned appellate order pre-date the proviso effective from 01.10.2025.

Analysis: The pre-amendment provision required payment of admitted amounts and a prescribed percentage of the remaining tax in dispute. The proviso specifically requiring a ten per cent pre-deposit in penalty-only matters became effective on 01.10.2025. The proceedings, including the show-cause notice, original order and appellate order, arose before that date. The amendment contained no express or necessarily implied retrospective operation. Imposing the subsequently introduced condition would curtail the vested substantive right of appeal applicable when the proceedings commenced.

Conclusion: No pre-deposit under Section 112(8) is required for admission of the present penalty-only appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was allowable on interest and dividend income from investments with cooperative societies and cooperative banks; (ii) whether the balance additional depreciation relating to machinery installed in the preceding year was allowable for Assessment Year 2016-17; and (iii) whether milk cans and artificial insemination and laboratory-testing equipment qualified as plant and machinery for additional depreciation.

Issue (i): Whether deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was allowable on interest and dividend income from investments with cooperative societies and cooperative banks.

Analysis: The issue stood covered by the earlier decision in the assessee's own case. Income received from investments in cooperative societies and cooperative banks satisfied the statutory requirement for deduction.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) was allowable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the balance additional depreciation relating to machinery installed in the preceding year was allowable for Assessment Year 2016-17.

Analysis: The third proviso permitting the unavailed balance of additional depreciation in the immediately succeeding previous year took effect from 1 April 2016. As the matter concerned Assessment Year 2016-17, the statutory entitlement applied.

Conclusion: The balance additional depreciation was allowable. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether milk cans and artificial insemination and laboratory-testing equipment qualified as plant and machinery for additional depreciation.

Analysis: The issue was governed by an earlier decision in the assessee's own case. Milk cans had been treated as plant for normal depreciation and fell within the definition of plant; therefore, additional depreciation could not be denied where the remaining conditions were met.

Conclusion: The milk cans and relevant equipment qualified for additional depreciation. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The deductions and additional-depreciation claims sustained by the appellate authorities remained available to the assessee for the relevant assessment years.

Issues: Whether a writ court should direct consideration of representations against recommendatory anti-dumping final findings when no statutory duty to consider them exists and a statutory appeal would lie after notification.

Analysis: A direction to consider a representation cannot create a remedy not provided by law or compel an authority to decide a representation absent a statutory obligation. The anti-dumping final findings were recommendatory and had not resulted in a Central Government notification. Upon notification, the statutory appellate remedy before CESTAT would be available. The requested writ intervention was therefore premature.

Conclusion: No direction for consideration of the representations was warranted; the writ petition was premature and the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the claim for tax concession was correctly classified as an expansion of an existing industrial unit rather than as a new industrial unit.

Analysis: The existing Sonepat unit had not availed any tax concession, and the application had been considered and allowed on merits rather than rejected for alleged suppression. The classification of the Gurugram unit under Rule 28C therefore required reconsideration in light of these facts and the applicable definitions.

Outcome: The Tribunal's order was set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication; entitlement to the claimed benefit was left open.

Issues: Whether uploading a show-cause notice or order-in-original in the 'View Additional Notices and Orders' tab on the GST Common Portal constitutes valid service under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The prior rulings governing the issue were applied. The retrospective amendment concerning functions capable of being performed on the Common Portal does not authorise the portal to substitute formal service of a show-cause notice or order. The Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 do not provide for service of such notice or order merely through the Common Portal; electronic communication under the Rules does not validate portal uploading where the document itself is not duly served. Portal-only uploading may not be challenged where the assessee acknowledged receipt or contested the proceedings by filing a reply; however, an ex parte adjudication following portal-only uploading requires restoration to the show-cause-notice stage, while limitation for an appeal against a contested order does not commence from such uploading.

Conclusion: Uploading a show-cause notice or order-in-original only on the Common Portal does not by itself amount to valid service. The writ petition was governed by the relief and consequences laid down in the prior rulings.