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Issues: (i) Whether the impugned rejection under section 52 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 was liable to be quashed on the ground that the decision was taken by the Central Government but communicated through the Central Board of Direct Taxes. (ii) Whether the order was liable to be quashed because it was not a speaking order.
Issue (i): Whether the impugned rejection under section 52 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 was liable to be quashed on the ground that the decision was taken by the Central Government but communicated through the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
Analysis: Section 52 vested the discretion to accept property in lieu of estate duty in the Central Government. The material on record showed that the Government had in fact considered the applications and taken the decision not to accept the offer, though the communication was issued by an officer of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The defect, if any, was only in the form of communication and did not vitiate the substantive decision.
Conclusion: The rejection was not liable to be quashed on this ground and the writ relief was not available.
Issue (ii): Whether the order was liable to be quashed because it was not a speaking order.
Analysis: Section 52 conferred discretionary power on the Central Government to accept or decline property in lieu of arrears, and the counter-affidavit disclosed the reasons for the decision. In these circumstances, absence of a more elaborate speaking order did not furnish a ground for interference under article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion: The order was not liable to be quashed for want of a speaking order.
Final Conclusion: No ground for certiorari or mandamus was made out, and the challenge to the rejection of the petitioner's request failed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the competent statutory authority has actually exercised its discretion and the reasons supporting refusal are disclosed in the record, a communication defect or lack of elaborate formality in the order does not by itself justify writ interference.