Limitation for Section 138 complaints runs from filing date, not from later issuance of summons.

A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was not barred by limitation merely because summons were issued years after filing. Limitation for cognizance was held to run from the date of filing of the complaint, not from the date when the Magistrate took cognizance or issued process. Once a competent complaint is filed, the later stage of cognizance and issuance of summons lies within the court's domain and does not affect maintainability. The limitation principle in Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held not to apply in the manner urged, and the Act does not require summons to be issued within any specific limitation period.

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Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was barred by limitation because the summons were issued several years after filing of the complaint and, on that basis, the summoning order was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: The limitation for computing cognizance was held to run from the date of filing of the complaint and not from the date on which the Magistrate took cognizance or issued process. Reliance was placed on the settled position that once a complainant files a competent complaint, the subsequent stage of taking cognizance and issuing summons is within the court's domain and does not affect maintainability. It was also noted that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not governed by the limitation principle urged by the petitioner under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the manner suggested, and that the statute does not prescribe that summons must be issued within any particular limitation period.

Conclusion: The complaint was not barred by limitation and the summoning order was not liable to be quashed on that ground.

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