Corporate insolvency prevails over Tea Act constraints; prior government consent is not required for CIRP initiation.

Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act was treated as inapplicable where the tea undertaking had not actually been taken over by an authorised person or body and the corporate debtor remained in management and control under the interim arrangement; initiation of Section 9 insolvency proceedings was therefore not barred. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was further described as a complete code for time-bound corporate revival, distinct from winding up, so prior Central Government consent was not required for proceedings under Sections 7 or 9. On any inconsistency, the Code prevailed over the earlier Tea Act by virtue of its overriding provision, and the insolvency petition was held maintainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953 barred initiation of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in the facts of the case. (ii) Whether prior consent of the Central Government was required before initiating proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether Section 16G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953 barred initiation of corporate insolvency resolution proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The statutory bar in Section 16G applies where the management of a tea undertaking or tea unit owned by a company has actually been taken over by a person or body authorised by the Central Government. On the facts, despite the notification under Section 16E, the corporate debtor continued to remain in management and control of the tea estates under the interim arrangement. The provision dealing with winding up and appointment of receiver was therefore held inapplicable to the insolvency proceedings in question.

Conclusion: Section 16G(1)(c) did not bar the initiation of proceedings under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (ii): Whether prior consent of the Central Government was required before initiating proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was treated as a complete code aimed at revival and continuation of the corporate debtor through a time-bound resolution process. Corporate insolvency resolution was distinguished from winding up, which is only a last resort. In case of any conflict, Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 gives the later enactment overriding effect over the Tea Act, 1953. Requiring prior governmental consent would frustrate the object of the insolvency legislation.

Conclusion: No prior consent of the Central Government was required, and the insolvency proceedings were maintainable without it.

Final Conclusion: The statutory appeal failed, and the order upholding maintainability of the insolvency petition was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Corporate insolvency resolution proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code are distinct from winding up, and the Code prevails over an earlier special statute to the extent of any inconsistency by virtue of its overriding provision.

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