Receipt-based time limit under settlement scheme governs compliance and defeats the constitutional challenge after retrospective amendment.

The thirty-day period for payment under section 90(2) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 was construed as running from receipt of the designated authority's order, not merely from the date of its passing, because a practical reading was needed to preserve the scheme's benefit. The retrospective substitution of section 90(2) also displaced the constitutional challenge to the original provision and made the amended time limit govern pending disputes. On the stated facts, the petitioners were treated as having complied by depositing the amount within thirty days of receipt, entitling them to settlement and requiring issuance of the final certificate, with recovery notices liable to be quashed.

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Issues: (i) Whether, under section 90(2) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, the period of thirty days for payment of the amount determined by the designated authority had to be computed from the date of passing of the order or from the date of receipt of the order. (ii) Whether the challenge to the constitutional validity of section 90(2) survived after its retrospective amendment, and whether the petitioners had complied with the amended time limit.

Issue (i): Whether, under section 90(2) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998, the period of thirty days for payment of the amount determined by the designated authority had to be computed from the date of passing of the order or from the date of receipt of the order.

Analysis: The provision was construed in the context of a remedy intended to be practical and effective. A construction tied to the date of communication or receipt was preferred over a literal reading based only on the date of passing of the order, especially where ambiguity would otherwise defeat the benefit of the scheme. The interpretation was also supported by authority holding that time for compliance with an order should run from the date of knowledge or receipt of that order.

Conclusion: The thirty-day period was held to run from the date of receipt of the order, not from the date of its passing, in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenge to the constitutional validity of section 90(2) survived after its retrospective amendment, and whether the petitioners had complied with the amended time limit.

Analysis: Section 90(2) was retrospectively substituted so that the time to pay ran from receipt of the order. In light of that amendment, the constitutional challenge no longer survived. On the facts, the petitioners received the certificate on 19/02/1999 and deposited the amount within thirty days of receipt.

Conclusion: The constitutional challenge was rendered infructuous, and the petitioners were held to have complied with the amended requirement.

Final Conclusion: The petitioners were entitled to settlement under the scheme, the designated authority was required to issue the final certificate, and the recovery notices were liable to be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory scheme requires payment within a specified period from an order of the designated authority, and the provision is retrospectively amended to make the period run from receipt of the order, the time limit is computed from receipt and the amended provision governs pending disputes.

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