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Issues: Whether the penalty under Section 271G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when the alleged default in complying with the document-production notice occurred before the amendment that conferred penalty jurisdiction on the Transfer Pricing Officer.
Analysis: The relevant default occurred when the assessee did not comply with the notice requiring production of documents under Section 92D(3) within the stipulated time. The governing principle is that, in penalty matters, the material date is the date of the wrongful act or default, and the law in force on that date determines the authority competent to impose penalty. The subsequent amendment expanding the Transfer Pricing Officer's jurisdiction could not shift the point of default or validate an order passed for an earlier default. The relied-upon contrary authority was found inapplicable because it did not alter the rule that jurisdiction in a penalty matter is fixed by the date of the offence.
Conclusion: The penalty order was without jurisdiction and could not be sustained; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded and the impugned penalty order was quashed.
Ratio Decidendi: In penalty proceedings, jurisdiction and liability are governed by the law in force on the date of the default or wrongful act, and a later amendment enlarging the authority's power does not validate action for an earlier default.