NBFC registration alone does not bar insolvency proceedings; functional test, notice, and winding-up principles controlled the outcome.

NBFC registration did not, by itself, exclude the respondent from insolvency proceedings under the Code; the Tribunal applied a functional test and held that exclusion depends on the nature of the transaction and whether the activity is in fact a financial service. The recall/review challenge based on alleged non-service and fraud failed because the record showed dispatch and receipt of notices, the applicant remained absent, and the order was treated as appealable rather than recallable on the facts proved. Pendency of winding-up petitions also did not bar admission, since no official liquidator had been appointed and the statutory bar was not attracted. The admission order was upheld, with costs imposed.

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Issues: (i) Whether registration as an NBFC automatically excludes a company from the scope of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code as a financial service provider. (ii) Whether the application for recall or review of the admission order was maintainable on the grounds of alleged non-service and alleged fraud. (iii) Whether pendency of winding-up petitions before the High Court barred admission of the insolvency petition before the Tribunal.

Issue (i): Whether registration as an NBFC automatically excludes a company from the scope of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code as a financial service provider.

Analysis: The relevant inquiry is not the mere status of registration as an NBFC, but the nature and character of the transaction in question. A corporate person is excluded only to the extent it falls within the expression "financial service provider" under the Code. Since the claim arose from an inter-corporate deposit and the activities in issue were not shown to be part of financial service activity, the functional test did not justify exclusion merely because the respondent held an NBFC registration. The Tribunal held that an NBFC is not ipso facto outside the definition of corporate person.

Conclusion: The respondent was not excluded from the Code merely by reason of NBFC registration; the objection on this ground failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the application for recall or review of the admission order was maintainable on the grounds of alleged non-service and alleged fraud.

Analysis: The material on record showed dispatch and receipt of the petition and notices, and the applicant remained absent on the dates fixed. The plea of non-service was therefore rejected. The order already passed was also treated as appealable under section 61 of the Code, and the Tribunal found no basis to accept the recall/review plea. The allegation that the order had been obtained by fraud did not furnish a ground for interference on the facts proved in the proceedings.

Conclusion: The challenge based on alleged non-service and fraud was rejected, and the recall/review application was not maintainable in the manner sought.

Issue (iii): Whether pendency of winding-up petitions before the High Court barred admission of the insolvency petition before the Tribunal.

Analysis: The Tribunal found no pleading or proof that an official liquidator had been appointed in the pending winding-up matters. In the absence of such an appointment, the statutory ineligibility bar was not attracted. The Tribunal also relied on the governing view that the relevant bar operates when liquidation has in fact been ordered in respect of the same corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The pendency of winding-up petitions did not bar admission of the insolvency proceeding on the facts before the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found no ground to recall the admission order and upheld the earlier order, with costs imposed on the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: Exclusion from insolvency proceedings depends on the statutory character of the activity and not on NBFC registration alone, and a pending winding-up petition without appointment of an official liquidator does not by itself bar proceedings under the Code.

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