Statutory repeal and abatement of pending proceedings upheld, with no vested right to continue under the old sick-company regime.

Section 4(b) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act was upheld as valid because the legislative scheme clearly replaced the earlier sick-company regime with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Pending proceedings before the Board or Appellate Authority were lawfully made to abate, while only sanctioned schemes were expressly preserved and carried into the new framework. The Court held that a statutory right of appeal or forum can be withdrawn by express provision or necessary implication, so no vested right, legitimate expectation, or equality-based claim survived against the repeal and transition mechanism. The writ petition failed, and the petitioner was left to pursue the remedy under the new insolvency regime.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 4(b) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 is unconstitutional for abating pending proceedings and limiting the remedy to the framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether a company whose rehabilitation scheme was pending before the Board had a vested right to continue under the repealed regime or to insist on a separate appeal and alternate treatment on the basis of legitimate expectation and equality.

Issue (i): Whether Section 4(b) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 is unconstitutional for abating pending proceedings and limiting the remedy to the framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The governing legislative scheme was held to reflect a clear intent to replace the earlier sick-company regime with the insolvency code. Proceedings pending before the Board or Appellate Authority were made to abate by express provision, while sanctioned schemes were separately protected and assimilated into the new regime. The Court held that the saving provisions were limited to the category expressly preserved by statute and that the cut-off date and transition mechanism were neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.

Conclusion: Section 4(b) was upheld as constitutionally valid.

Issue (ii): Whether a company whose rehabilitation scheme was pending before the Board had a vested right to continue under the repealed regime or to insist on a separate appeal and alternate treatment on the basis of legitimate expectation and equality.

Analysis: The right of appeal was treated as a statutory right capable of being taken away by express provision or necessary intendment. The Court held that the repeal and substitution of the earlier enactment, coupled with the express abatement clause, displaced any claim to be governed by the old law. The classification between sanctioned schemes and pending schemes was found to be rational and germane to the object of the new insolvency framework, and no enforceable legitimate expectation survived against the clear legislative mandate.

Conclusion: The claimed vested right, equality challenge, and legitimate expectation argument were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed and the statutory transition to the insolvency regime was sustained, leaving the petitioner to pursue the remedy available under the new code.

Ratio Decidendi: A vested right of appeal or forum is protected only until a clear legislative amendment expresses or necessarily implies its withdrawal, and a repeal statute may validly abate pending proceedings while creating a rational transition to a new adjudicatory regime.

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