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Issues: (i) Whether special leave to appeal against the acquittal was to be granted in exercise of the limited appellate power under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether the cheque was vitiated by material alteration and whether the complainant had established the ingredients of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Issue (i): Whether special leave to appeal against the acquittal was to be granted in exercise of the limited appellate power under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Leave against acquittal is not to be granted as a matter of course. Interference is justified only where the findings of the trial court are perverse, capricious, contrary to evidence, or based on misreading or erroneous appreciation of facts and law. Where the trial court has taken a probable view on the evidence, the strengthened presumption of innocence following acquittal calls for restraint.
Conclusion: Special leave was not warranted and interference with the acquittal was declined.
Issue (ii): Whether the cheque was vitiated by material alteration and whether the complainant had established the ingredients of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: A material alteration under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is one that affects the rights of the parties in a substantive manner. The alteration of date and amount on the cheque, together with the evidentiary inconsistencies as to when the cheque was issued and who altered it, created a serious doubt. The complainant also failed to establish the alleged advance payment and the asserted underlying liability with reliable evidence. In such circumstances, the statutory presumption under Section 139 did not sustain the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion: The cheque was treated as materially altered and the offence under Section 138 was not proved.
Final Conclusion: The acquittal was found to be free from legal infirmity, and no appellate interference was called for.
Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal, leave will be refused where the trial court has taken a probable view on evidence, and a cheque prosecution fails if material alteration and the foundational liability are not proved so as to displace the statutory presumption.