Sufficient cause for condonation of delay accepted where counsel's serious illness and death prevented timely filing of the appeal.

Delay of 120 days in filing a statutory appeal was examined under the requirement of sufficient cause for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The explanation that the matter had been entrusted to counsel who suffered a serious liver ailment, underwent hospitalization for a liver transplant, and later died was accepted as plausible. Applying a liberal approach to short delay and the facts of the case, the Court found the delay to be due to circumstances beyond the appellant's control and held that condonation was warranted, with the appeal to be heard on merits. The refusal to condone delay was set aside.

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Issues: Whether the delay of 120 days in filing the statutory appeal was liable to be condoned on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Analysis: The explanation for delay was that the appellant had handed over the matter to counsel, who was suffering from serious liver ailment, remained hospitalized for liver transplant, and later died. The principles governing condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 require a finding of sufficient cause on the facts of each case, with a liberal approach in cases of short delay and a stricter scrutiny where the delay is inordinate. The Court found the explanation plausible and held that the delay occurred due to circumstances beyond the appellant's control, satisfying the requirement of sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The delay ought to have been condoned, and the appeal was required to be heard on merits. The refusal to condone delay was set aside.

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