Small scale industry exemption turns on assigned brand name treatment and consistency in departmental stand on earlier and later periods.

Small scale industry exemption under Notification No. 1/93-C.E. turned on whether goods bearing a brand name assigned by another person remained ineligible and whether the Department could reject the claim for 19.4.1995 to 18.4.1996 after accepting the same assignment arrangement for a later period. The notification's explanation treated registered and unregistered brand names alike, but the assignment principles recognised under trade mark law showed that a written assignment could not be disregarded merely because registration was procedural. On that basis, the Department could not adopt a contrary position for the earlier period, and the exemption claim for that period had to be reconsidered on merits.

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Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to small scale industry exemption under Notification No. 1/93-C.E. for the period 19.4.1995 to 18.4.1996 despite use of a brand name said to have been assigned by another person, and whether the Department could deny the benefit for that period when it had accepted the assignment for the later period.

Analysis: The exemption notification denied benefit to specified goods bearing the brand name or trade name of another person, but its explanation covered brand names whether registered or not. The trade mark law provisions relied upon by the parties showed that assignment in writing was recognised and that registration of the assignment was a procedural requirement, not a basis to deny the factual assignment itself where the Department had already acted upon the agreement for the subsequent period. In that situation, the Department could not take a contrary stand for the earlier period, and the Tribunal ought to examine the entitlement for the disputed period in the light of the notification and the admitted assignment arrangement.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to have the claim for exemption for 19.4.1995 to 18.4.1996 reconsidered on merits, and the denial of exemption for that period could not be sustained as final.

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