Prior approval as a condition precedent makes unauthorised appointments void and bars later validation or senior-panel claims.

Prior approval under Regulation 101 was a condition precedent for appointment to a non-teaching post in an aided institution, so an appointment made without such approval was void and could not be validated by later approval. The same reasoning meant the appointee could not rely on post facto sanction to sustain the appointment. The document also states that, where the higher-ranked candidate's refusal to join was not proved and remained unchallenged, the second empanelled candidate had no enforceable right to appointment against the vacancy.

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Issues: (i) Whether prior approval under Regulation 101 was mandatory before issuance of an appointment letter to a non-teaching post in an aided institution and whether post facto approval could validate the appointment; (ii) Whether the appellant could claim appointment as the second empanelled candidate when the first candidate's refusal to join was not proved.

Issue (i): Whether prior approval under Regulation 101 was mandatory before issuance of an appointment letter to a non-teaching post in an aided institution and whether post facto approval could validate the appointment.

Analysis: Regulation 101 required prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools before filling a vacancy of a non-teaching post. The distinction between "prior approval" and mere "approval" was material, because prior approval was a condition precedent to appointment. The Court followed the interpretation placed by earlier Division Bench decisions that anything done without prior approval is a nullity and cannot be cured by subsequent approval. The appellant's appointment having been made without obtaining prior approval, the later approval did not validate the appointment.

Conclusion: The appointment was illegal and void, and post facto approval did not cure the defect.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant could claim appointment as the second empanelled candidate when the first candidate's refusal to join was not proved.

Analysis: The select list placed another candidate at serial no. 1 and the appellant at serial no. 2. The factual finding recorded in the impugned order was that the first candidate had neither declined the appointment nor resigned. That finding remained unchallenged in the writ proceedings. In the absence of proof that the first candidate had refused appointment, the appellant had no enforceable claim to be appointed against the vacancy.

Conclusion: The appellant had no right to appointment as the second candidate in the select list.

Final Conclusion: The appointment could not be sustained for want of mandatory prior approval and for absence of proof that the higher-ranked candidate had declined the post, so the challenge to the adverse order failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute requires prior approval as a condition precedent, an appointment made without such approval is void and cannot be validated by subsequent approval.

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