Independent dismissal power under the Border Security Force Act upheld where notice and opportunity under the Rules were given.

Section 11(2) of the Border Security Force Act confers an independent administrative power to dismiss or remove a person under command, distinct from punishment through a Security Force Court. The Court held that a Security Force Court enquiry was not a mandatory precondition where the Commandant acted as the prescribed officer under the Rules. It further found that the notice satisfied Rule 20 because the respondent was informed of the allegations and given an opportunity to defend himself, so no further enquiry was required on the facts. Treating the period of absence as extraordinary leave did not invalidate the dismissal, because the operative basis was that continued retention in service had become undesirable.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Commandant had authority to dismiss the respondent in exercise of the independent power under Section 11(2) of the Border Security Force Act read with the Rules, without first proceeding through a Security Force Court; (ii) whether the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice were complied with, and whether treating the period of absence as extraordinary leave invalidated the dismissal.

Issue (i): Whether the Commandant had authority to dismiss the respondent in exercise of the independent power under Section 11(2) of the Border Security Force Act read with the Rules, without first proceeding through a Security Force Court.

Analysis: The power to dismiss or remove a person under command under Section 11(2) is distinct from the power to punish offences through a Security Force Court. The Court applied the earlier construction of the provision and treated the Commandant as a prescribed officer competent to act under the Rule corresponding to that power. The earlier view of the courts below, that a Security Force Court enquiry was a necessary precondition, was held to be erroneous.

Conclusion: The Commandant was competent to pass the dismissal order under Section 11(2) of the Border Security Force Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice were complied with, and whether treating the period of absence as extraordinary leave invalidated the dismissal.

Analysis: Section 11 is subject to the Act and the Rules, and Rule 20 requires notice of the proposed termination, disclosure of the allegations, and an opportunity to submit a defence. The notice issued to the respondent satisfied those requirements, and he did not deny the allegations or seek an enquiry, so no further enquiry was necessary on the facts. The later treatment of the absence period as extraordinary leave was held not to destroy the basis of the dismissal, because the dismissal rested on the conclusion that continued retention in service had become undesirable, not on punishment for absence as such.

Conclusion: The dismissal was in accordance with the Act and the Rules, and treating the absence as extraordinary leave did not invalidate it.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal order was upheld and the respondent's suit challenging it was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: The power to terminate service under Section 11(2) of the Border Security Force Act is an independent administrative power, and when the statutory notice-and-opportunity procedure under the Rules is followed, dismissal is valid even without a Security Force Court trial; treating the absence period as extraordinary leave does not vitiate the order if the real basis is that retention in service has become undesirable.

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