University fee powers yield to mandatory statutory fee fixation for medical and engineering courses

A university was treated as an educational institution under Section 2(b) of the 1992 Act because the first limb of the definition covered institutions imparting education leading to degrees or diplomas conferred by a university established under State law, without any separate government notification. The notification requirement applied only to the residuary category. For medical and engineering courses, however, the special fee-fixation mechanism under Section 4(2-A) of the 1992 Act prevailed over the university's general fee-setting power under the 2013 Act, so fees had to be fixed by the statutory Committee on Fixation of Fee. Statutory estoppel could not override that mandate.

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Issues: (i) Whether the University fell within the definition of educational institution under Section 2(b) of the 1992 Act without any separate notification by the Government. (ii) Whether the University could fix and collect fees for medical and engineering courses on its own under the 2013 Act, without reference to the Committee on Fixation of Fee under the 1992 Act.

Issue (i): Whether the University fell within the definition of educational institution under Section 2(b) of the 1992 Act without any separate notification by the Government.

Analysis: The definition of educational institution contained two distinct parts. The first part covered any institution imparting education leading to a degree or diploma conferred by a University established under a State law, and this part operated independently of any governmental notification. The requirement of notification applied only to the residuary category of other educational institutions. The University, by virtue of the legal fiction created under the 2013 Act, was deemed to have been established under a law made by the State Legislature and therefore answered the first part of the definition. The insistence on prior notification for such an institution was incorrect.

Conclusion: The University was covered by Section 2(b) of the 1992 Act without any separate notification.

Issue (ii): Whether the University could fix and collect fees for medical and engineering courses on its own under the 2013 Act, without reference to the Committee on Fixation of Fee under the 1992 Act.

Analysis: The 2013 Act contained general powers enabling the University to prescribe and collect fees, but Section 4(2-A) of the 1992 Act was a special provision with overriding effect for institutions imparting education leading to degrees in medicine or engineering. For such courses, the fee structure had to be fixed by the statutory Committee on Fixation of Fee. The plea of estoppel against the students could not defeat the mandate of the statute. The University's own fee structure, insofar as these professional courses were concerned, could not stand without committee fixation.

Conclusion: The University was not entitled to fix and collect the impugned fees without prior fixation by the Committee on Fixation of Fee.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's view was set aside and the fee issue was required to be determined by the statutory fee-fixing mechanism under the 1992 Act.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute creates a mandatory, overriding fee-fixation mechanism for specified professional courses, a university's general power to prescribe fees cannot displace that mechanism, and a statutory definition must be read according to its standalone limbs without importing a notification requirement into the part that does not contain one.

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