Fraud challenge to compromise decree remains maintainable where the decree was passed by a limited-jurisdiction revenue court.

A separate civil suit challenging a compromise decree on the ground of fraud was not barred where the decree had been passed by a revenue court exercising limited jurisdiction under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Although Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure ordinarily bars a separate suit to set aside a compromise decree, that bar must be read with the nature of the forum that recorded the compromise. Civil court jurisdiction under Section 9 CPC remains available unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded, and no such exclusion was found here. The objection under Order XXIII Rule 3-A therefore failed.

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Issues: Whether a civil suit challenging a compromise decree of a revenue court on the ground of fraud is barred by Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: A compromise decree based on an unlawful or fraudulent compromise is ordinarily assailable only before the court that recorded it, and Order XXIII Rule 3-A bars a separate suit to set aside such a decree. The bar, however, must be read in the context of the forum that passed the decree. Here, the decree was passed by a revenue court exercising limited and restricted jurisdiction under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Such courts are not equipped to effectively adjudicate allegations of fraud involving serious civil and criminal overtones. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 preserves the civil court's jurisdiction unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded, and nothing in Order XXIII Rule 3-A shows an intention to exclude a civil suit challenging a decree of a court of limited jurisdiction passed under a different statute.

Conclusion: The civil suit was not barred, and the objection under Order XXIII Rule 3-A failed.

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