Second appeal limits under Section 100 CPC bar interference with concurrent findings absent a substantial question of law.

Section 100 CPC limits second appeals to substantial questions of law, and the High Court cannot disturb concurrent findings of fact without a properly framed question. The High Court erred by introducing a tenancy theory that was neither pleaded nor the basis of the courts below' findings, and its interference with ownership, adverse possession, and possession findings was outside its jurisdiction. Tenancy was not proved because the respondent produced no lease deed, rent receipts, or evidence from any landlord, and a recital in the sale deed did not establish tenancy. The trial court and first appellate court's findings in favour of the appellant were therefore restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court, in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could interfere with concurrent findings of the courts below without a properly framed substantial question of law. (ii) Whether the respondent had proved tenancy so as to defeat the appellant's suit for possession and whether the concurrent findings on title and adverse possession could be disturbed.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court, in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could interfere with concurrent findings of the courts below without a properly framed substantial question of law.

Analysis: Section 100 confines a second appeal to substantial questions of law formulated by the High Court, with a limited power to frame an additional question for recorded reasons. The only question framed concerned whether the courts below had decided contrary to pleadings, evidence, and the recitals in the sale deed. No separate substantial question was framed against the concurrent findings on ownership, adverse possession, or the nature of possession. The High Court nevertheless proceeded on a tenancy theory not pleaded by the respondent and not the basis of the courts below' findings. Such interference ignored the statutory limits of second appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in upsetting the concurrent findings in second appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent had proved tenancy so as to defeat the appellant's suit for possession and whether the concurrent findings on title and adverse possession could be disturbed.

Analysis: The respondent's written statement did not plead tenancy; instead, it denied the appellant's title and asserted adverse possession. No rent receipts, lease deed, or supporting evidence from the alleged landlord was produced to establish tenancy. The sale deed recital merely showed possession and did not create or prove a tenancy. The trial court and first appellate court concurrently found the appellant to be the owner and the respondent to be an encroacher who failed to prove adverse possession. These findings were based on the pleadings and evidence and were not shown to be perverse or legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The respondent failed to prove tenancy, and the concurrent findings in favour of the appellant were liable to stand.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and the decrees of the trial court and first appellate court were restored, resulting in success for the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal, the High Court cannot reverse concurrent findings of fact on a ground not pleaded or not covered by a substantial question of law, and a finding recorded on a matter dehors the pleadings is without jurisdiction.

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