Mandatory land acquisition time limits and urgency powers cannot override Section 5-A rights without real, immediate necessity.

A mandatory outer limit under the validating statute governed declarations following a pre-commencement land acquisition notice; once the declaration under Section 6 was made beyond two years from commencement, the earlier Section 4 notification lapsed and the acquisition could not survive. The Court also held that urgency powers dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry could be used only on proof of real and immediate necessity supported by material, and not after an unexplained delay of about seven years. As no such urgency was shown, the invocation of Section 17 and exclusion of objections was legally unsustainable. The acquisition proceedings therefore failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 had lapsed because the declaration under Section 6 was made beyond the time limit prescribed by Section 5(2) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1981; (ii) Whether the invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A after about seven years from the preliminary notification was legally sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the preliminary notification issued under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 had lapsed because the declaration under Section 6 was made beyond the time limit prescribed by Section 5(2) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1981.

Analysis: The acquisition had commenced before the 1981 Amendment Act, and Section 5(2) of that Act, operating notwithstanding Section 5(1)(b), mandated that no declaration under Section 6 in respect of land covered by a pre-commencement notice under Section 4(5) could be made after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the Amendment Act. The provision was treated as mandatory, leaving no discretion to extend the period. Since the declaration was issued much beyond that limit, the statutory consequence was lapse of the earlier notification and the acquisition could not survive.

Conclusion: The preliminary notification had lapsed and the declaration under Section 6 was legally unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A after about seven years from the preliminary notification was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The right under Section 5-A was recognised as a valuable and substantive right, and the extraordinary power under Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) could be used only in cases of real urgency where delay of even a few weeks or months would frustrate the public purpose. No material was shown to justify excluding the inquiry after such a long delay, and the nature of the proposed bus stand did not disclose an urgency of the kind required by law. The State's invocation of urgency was therefore inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the settled limits on the exceptional power.

Conclusion: The invocation of urgency and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A were not legally sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The acquisition proceedings failed both on limitation under the validating statute and on the improper use of urgency powers, and the landowners were entitled to relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a validating statute prescribes a mandatory outer limit for making a declaration under land acquisition law, a declaration issued beyond that limit causes the acquisition to lapse; further, urgency powers dispensing with objection proceedings can be exercised only on a showing of real and immediate necessity supported by relevant material.

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