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Issues: (i) Whether a cheque dishonoured on instructions to stop payment remains actionable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when the drawer has asked the payee not to present it for encashment; (ii) Whether the complaints and process issued against the petitioners, including those said to be dormant partners, were liable to be quashed at the threshold under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (i): Whether a cheque dishonoured on instructions to stop payment remains actionable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when the drawer has asked the payee not to present it for encashment.
Analysis: The Court held that the question was covered by the Supreme Court's later interpretation of sections 138, 139 and 140 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Once a cheque is issued, the statutory presumption under section 139 follows, and a drawer cannot avoid criminal liability merely by issuing a stop-payment instruction or by asking the payee not to present the cheque. The offence under section 138 is attracted on dishonour in the circumstances contemplated by the statute, and mens rea is not an essential ingredient because the scheme of sections 138 to 140 creates strict liability.
Conclusion: The dishonour of the cheques on stop-payment instructions did attract section 138, and the defence that the cheques were not to be presented did not defeat the prosecution.
Issue (ii): Whether the complaints and process issued against the petitioners, including those said to be dormant partners, were liable to be quashed at the threshold under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The Court held that the complaints disclosed a prima facie case and that the petitioners' contentions, including the claim that some partners were not concerned with management, were matters for trial. The statutory presumptions under section 139 remained available to the accused to rebut in the proceedings before the Magistrate, and the allegations were not so lacking in substance as to justify quashing at the threshold.
Conclusion: The proceedings were not liable to be quashed under section 482, and the process issued by the Magistrate was sustained.
Final Conclusion: The petitions failed on merits because the statutory scheme governing dishonour of cheques applied notwithstanding stop-payment instructions, and the accused were left to contest liability in the trial court.
Ratio Decidendi: Dishonour of a cheque on stop-payment instructions after issuance attracts section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the drawer's rebuttal of the statutory presumption under section 139 is a matter for trial rather than a ground for threshold quashing.