Superannuation age enhancement cannot be made retrospective by court where statutory approval and prospective government policy control effect.

Where service-regulation amendments require prior governmental approval, the effective date of an enhancement to the age of superannuation remains within the executive domain, and a court cannot rewrite a prospective Government Order into a retrospective one. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded the limits of judicial review by directing retrospective operation from an earlier date despite final rejection of the earlier proposal and the statutory approval framework. It further held that employees who had already superannuated before interim protection and before approved enhancement took effect were not entitled to salary or consequential benefits for the period not worked, as promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation did not arise on a mere recommendation subject to approval.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could direct that the enhancement of the age of superannuation operate retrospectively from 29 June 2002 instead of prospectively from the date of the Government Order. (ii) Whether the employees were entitled to salary and consequential benefits for the period during which they had not worked after attaining the age of superannuation.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could direct that the enhancement of the age of superannuation operate retrospectively from 29 June 2002 instead of prospectively from the date of the Government Order.

Analysis: The enhancement of superannuation age in NOIDA was subject to the statutory scheme under the UP Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 and required prior approval of the State Government under Section 19 before any amendment to the service regulations could take effect. The earlier proposal had already been rejected and that rejection had attained finality. The later Government Order expressly made the enhancement prospective. Fixing the date from which such policy change would operate was within the executive domain, and the High Court exceeded the limits of judicial review by substituting its own date and treating the policy decision as arbitrary on erroneous factual premises.

Conclusion: The retrospective direction was unsustainable and the Government Order could not be rewritten by the court; the issue is decided in favour of the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the employees were entitled to salary and consequential benefits for the period during which they had not worked after attaining the age of superannuation.

Analysis: The employees had superannuated before any interim protection was granted. Their continuation in service depended upon the statutory approval process and the Government Order was only prospective. The doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation did not apply because the Board resolution was only a recommendation subject to government approval. The plea based on no work no pay was therefore unavailable on these facts.

Conclusion: The employees were not entitled to salary or consequential benefits for the period they did not work after superannuation; the issue is decided in favour of the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's judgment was set aside, the writ petition stood dismissed, and the enhancement of retirement age remained operative only prospectively from the Government's approval.

Ratio Decidendi: Where service-regulation amendments require prior governmental approval, the effective date of a policy decision lies in the executive domain, and a court exercising judicial review cannot confer retrospective operation or create vested rights before statutory approval is granted.

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