Interested trap witness evidence needs independent corroboration; hostile testimony and accused silence cannot, by themselves, prove bribery.

Testimony of interested trap witnesses must be scrutinised with great caution, and a conviction cannot safely rest on such evidence without dependable independent corroboration of demand, payment and recovery. A witness who is declared hostile does not lose all evidentiary value, but only the credible part of his testimony may be used; isolated, discredited answers and previous police statements cannot serve as substantive corroboration. An accused's silence when confronted with a bribery allegation, or the detention of a complainant, is not by itself reliable proof of guilt where innocent explanations remain plausible.

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Issues: (i) Whether the conviction could be sustained on the testimony of interested trap witnesses without reliable independent corroboration. (ii) Whether the prosecution could rely on selective portions of the evidence of witnesses cross-examined by the prosecution as hostile. (iii) Whether the accused's silence on being accused of bribery and the detention of the complainant furnished corroboration of guilt.

Issue (i): Whether the conviction could be sustained on the testimony of interested trap witnesses without reliable independent corroboration.

Analysis: The prosecution witnesses who supported the trap were not ordinary eyewitnesses but persons closely connected with the trap and were found to be of questionable antecedents. In such circumstances, the evidence had to be scrutinised with great caution. The courts below had relied on their testimony without adequate independent support, although the surrounding circumstances and the defence evidence created serious doubt about the prosecution version. The absence of dependable corroboration on the crucial aspects of demand, payment and recovery made it unsafe to rest a conviction on that evidence alone.

Conclusion: The conviction could not be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the interested trap witnesses.

Issue (ii): Whether the prosecution could rely on selective portions of the evidence of witnesses cross-examined by the prosecution as hostile.

Analysis: A witness does not cease to be a witness merely because he is permitted to be cross-examined by the party calling him. His evidence is not washed off the record in toto, and the Court may rely on such part of it as remains creditworthy. But where the witnesses have substantially resiled from their previous statements and their credit has been seriously shaken, it is unsafe to pick out isolated sentences to support the prosecution case. Previous police statements of such witnesses are not substantive evidence and cannot be used to obtain corroboration or assurance for the prosecution version.

Conclusion: The prosecution could not validly rely on isolated parts of the hostile witnesses' evidence or on their police statements as corroboration.

Issue (iii): Whether the accused's silence on being accused of bribery and the detention of the complainant furnished corroboration of guilt.

Analysis: The accused's silence, even if treated as conduct, had little probative value in the facts of the case, because an innocent person might also remain silent when suddenly accused by a superior officer. Likewise, the detention of the complainant was consistent with the explanation that he had been brought for interrogation on suspicion. Neither circumstance independently pointed to guilt, nor did they provide the corroboration needed to support the testimony of the interested witnesses.

Conclusion: These circumstances did not furnish reliable corroboration of the charge.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Ratio Decidendi: In a criminal case, testimony of interested trap witnesses must be approached with caution and, where materially weakened or uncorroborated, cannot safely found a conviction; hostile witness evidence may be relied upon only to the extent it remains credible, but not through selective use of discredited statements or police statements as substantive corroboration.

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