Revisional scrutiny of evidence-shutting order upheld, with informant's revision held maintainable in criminal trial

An order refusing to mark the informant's statement as an exhibit was treated as an intermediate order because it substantially affected the prosecution case and could cause serious prejudice; it was therefore not barred from revisional scrutiny under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court also held that a revision by the informant/complainant was maintainable, since the High Court's revisional power is wide and Section 372 does not prevent an otherwise competent revision. The refusal to receive material evidence and the dismissal of the revision were set aside, and the statement was directed to be proved in evidence.

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Issues: (i) Whether the order declining to mark the informant's statement as an exhibit was an interlocutory order barred from revision under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) Whether a criminal revision at the instance of the informant/complainant was maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the order declining to mark the informant's statement as an exhibit was an interlocutory order barred from revision under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: An order is not interlocutory if it substantially affects the rights of the parties or has the potential to cause serious prejudice in the criminal trial. The statement in question formed the basis of the FIR and the setting of the criminal law in motion. Treating it as a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and refusing to mark it as an exhibit would have imperilled the prosecution case and resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice. The order was therefore an intermediate order, not a purely interlocutory one.

Conclusion: The order was not barred from revisional scrutiny under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (ii): Whether a criminal revision at the instance of the informant/complainant was maintainable.

Analysis: The revisional power of the High Court under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is wide enough to be exercised even suo motu, and the fact that the request comes from a third party does not by itself render the revision incompetent. The restriction in Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not curtail a revision that is otherwise maintainable so long as it is not directed against an interlocutory order. Since the refusal to receive the statement as evidence adversely affected the informant's interest and the prosecution's case, the revision was competent.

Conclusion: The revision filed by the informant/complainant was maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The trial court's refusal to mark the informant's statement as an exhibit and the High Court's dismissal of the revision were set aside, and the prosecution was directed to prove the statement in evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: An order that substantially affects the conduct of a criminal trial and may cause miscarriage of justice is not interlocutory, and a private complainant or informant may invoke revisional jurisdiction where the trial court wrongly shuts out material evidence.

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