State vicarious liability in tort survives for non-sovereign acts; Article 300(1) preserves pre-Constitution liability.

State liability in tort extends to negligent acts of its servants committed in the course of ordinary employment when the act is wholly dissociated from sovereign functions. The employee's conduct here was treated as part of the State's administrative use of a vehicle, so the State was vicariously liable. Article 300(1) was read as continuing the pre-Constitution position through the relevant statutory chain, preserving liability in the same class of cases where the corresponding authorities could previously have been sued. The constitutional provision therefore did not confer immunity, and the claim against the State was maintainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether the State was vicariously liable for the tortious act of its employee committed while the vehicle was being driven back from repairs and not in the exercise of sovereign power. (ii) Whether Article 300(1) of the Constitution preserved the pre-Constitution liability of the State in tort.

Issue (i): Whether the State was vicariously liable for the tortious act of its employee committed while the vehicle was being driven back from repairs and not in the exercise of sovereign power.

Analysis: The act complained of was wholly dissociated from the exercise of sovereign powers. The vehicle was being used in connection with the State's ordinary administrative arrangements, and the position of the State in supplying cars and drivers for civil service was treated as comparable to that of any other employer in relation to torts committed in the course of employment.

Conclusion: The State was vicariously liable for the employee's tortious act; the conclusion is against the State and in favour of the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether Article 300(1) of the Constitution preserved the pre-Constitution liability of the State in tort.

Analysis: Article 300(1) was construed as carrying forward the earlier statutory position through the chain of enactments from the Government of India Acts, and therefore as preserving liability in the same class of cases in which the corresponding pre-Constitution authorities could have been sued. No rule was shown that excluded such liability for the predecessor State.

Conclusion: Article 300(1) did not bar the claim; it supported the continuation of the pre-Constitution liability, and the answer is against the State and in favour of the respondents.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the State could not claim immunity for a non-sovereign tort committed by its employee within the course of employment, and the constitutional succession provision did not displace that liability.

Ratio Decidendi: The State is liable in tort for negligent acts of its servants committed in the course of ordinary employment and not in the exercise of sovereign functions, and Article 300(1) preserves that liability in the same class of cases as existed before the Constitution.

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