Lawful right to the site under petroleum licensing requires subsisting tenancy, not mere rent acceptance after lease expiry.

Rule 153(1) of the Petroleum Rules, 1976 requires a lawful subsisting right to the site; mere continued occupation and acceptance of rent after lease expiry do not, by themselves, create a fresh tenancy or preserve that right. The Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 does not protect occupation of vacant land used for a petrol bunk, where the lease is of land and any shed is treated as the tenant's own structure. In the absence of a continuing legal right to the site, renewal or continuation of the petroleum licence and no objection certificate cannot be claimed on that basis.

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Issues: (i) Whether mere acceptance of rent by the landlord after expiry or termination of the lease created a tenancy or preserved the appellant's right to the site under Rule 153(1) of the Petroleum Rules, 1976; (ii) Whether the appellant was entitled to claim protection as a statutory tenant under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969; (iii) Whether the writ court could interfere with renewal or cancellation of the petroleum licence and no objection certificate when the appellant had no continuing lawful right to the site.

Issue (i): Whether mere acceptance of rent by the landlord after expiry or termination of the lease created a tenancy or preserved the appellant's right to the site under Rule 153(1) of the Petroleum Rules, 1976.

Analysis: The right contemplated by Rule 153(1) is a lawful right to the site. A mere continuance in possession after expiry of the lease, even with payment received by the landlord, does not by itself create a fresh tenancy or convert wrongful occupation into lawful possession. The authorities on holding over and acceptance of rent show that a new tenancy arises only where the landlord assents to continued possession in the legal sense. On the facts, the lease had ended, the landlord had disputed continuance, and the appellant's possession was not enough to establish a subsisting legal right to the site.

Conclusion: The appellant had no continuing lawful right to the site, and mere acceptance of rent did not create a tenancy in his favour.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant was entitled to claim protection as a statutory tenant under the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969.

Analysis: The lease deed, the schedule to the plaint, and the notice showed that what had been leased was vacant land for running a petrol bunk, with permission only to put up specified constructions. The Rent Control Act applies to buildings, not to a vacant site of this nature. The small shed referred to in the record was treated as belonging to the tenant and not as a landlord's building so as to attract statutory protection.

Conclusion: The appellant was not a statutory tenant protected by the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ court could interfere with renewal or cancellation of the petroleum licence and no objection certificate when the appellant had no continuing lawful right to the site.

Analysis: Rule 144 concerns the grant of no objection certificate on suitability of the site, while Rule 153(1) makes the licence liable to cancellation when the licensee ceases to have a right to the site. The licensing authority is not required to adjudicate ownership disputes, but where the licensee has lost the lawful right to remain on the site, renewal cannot be claimed. In the absence of a subsisting legal right, the writ challenge to the landlord's move for cancellation could not succeed.

Conclusion: The writ petition and the challenge to renewal of the licence were maintainable against the appellant, and the licence could not be continued on the basis of an absent lawful right to the site.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the appellant's occupation after termination of the lease was not a lawful or statutory right, and the petroleum licence could not be sustained on that basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Rule 153(1) of the Petroleum Rules, 1976, the expression "right to the site" means a lawful subsisting right and not mere physical or juridical possession, and acceptance of rent after termination does not by itself create a fresh tenancy or statutory protection.

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