Section 126 privilege for lawyer communications ends once a reply notice is disclosed to the other side.

A defamatory reply notice issued through counsel was held not to retain Section 126 privilege once the communication had already been disclosed to the opposite party, because confidentiality was lost on transmission. The Court also stated that express consent under Section 126 need not be in writing and may be inferred from circumstances, including the client's act of having the notice issued through an advocate. On that basis, the reply notice could be relied on in the defamation prosecution, and the complaint was not liable to be quashed on the claimed privilege ground.

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Issues: Whether a defamatory reply notice issued by the petitioner's advocate could be relied on in a defamation prosecution despite the privilege under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Analysis: The petition challenged cognizance under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the ground that the impugned statement in the advocate's reply notice was a communication protected by Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court held that the privilege under Section 126 is against disclosure of confidential communications made to counsel, but once the communication has already been revealed to the other side in the form of a notice, the element of confidentiality is lost. The Court further held that express consent under Section 126 need not be in writing and may be inferred from circumstances, including the client's act of causing the notice to be issued through counsel.

Conclusion: The reply notice was not protected by Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the complaint was not liable to be quashed on that ground.

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