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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court could take judicial notice of the High Court's habeas corpus judgment and the connected administrative reports while deciding the appeal against acquittal; (ii) whether the accused's subsequent conduct in influencing witnesses and subverting the trial was relevant; (iii) whether the written statement/FIR of the injured informant could be treated as a dying declaration and relied upon despite non-exhibition; and (iv) whether the testimony of CW-1, the deceased's mother, was reliable.
Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court could take judicial notice of the High Court's habeas corpus judgment and the connected administrative reports while deciding the appeal against acquittal.
Analysis: The judgment in the habeas corpus proceedings was treated as a public document founded on authoritative materials, including the inspecting judge's report and the statements recorded under court directions. It was held that, in the peculiar facts of the case, the judgment and connected findings could be judicially noticed to the extent they established the subsequent conduct of the accused and the manner in which the criminal trial had been interfered with.
Conclusion: Judicial notice of the habeas corpus judgment and connected reports was permissible to the limited extent relied upon.
Issue (ii): Whether the accused's subsequent conduct in influencing witnesses and subverting the trial was relevant.
Analysis: The conduct of an accused is relevant when it influences or is influenced by a fact in issue. The Court applied Section 8 of the Evidence Act and held that the efforts made to abduct and intimidate witnesses, the interference in the trial, and the use of institutional pressure were highly relevant circumstances pointing to guilt. Such conduct supported an adverse inference against the principal accused.
Conclusion: The accused's subsequent conduct was relevant and adverse to him.
Issue (iii): Whether the written statement/FIR of the injured informant could be treated as a dying declaration and relied upon despite non-exhibition.
Analysis: The Court held that the FIR based on the injured informant's written statement was a public document and that mere non-marking as an exhibit did not defeat its genuineness where the surrounding record showed deliberate failure of the prosecution machinery. Since the maker died of the injuries suffered in the incident, the written statement was admissible as a dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act and could form substantive evidence.
Conclusion: The FIR/written statement was rightly treated as a dying declaration and relied upon.
Issue (iv): Whether the testimony of CW-1, the deceased's mother, was reliable.
Analysis: The Court found that CW-1's evidence was consistent with the dying declaration and with the surrounding circumstances. Her answer in cross-examination that her son had asked her to name the accused did not, in the setting of the case, render her testimony tutored. Minor discrepancies were held immaterial, and the Court accepted her as a truthful eye-witness whose evidence corroborated the prosecution case.
Conclusion: CW-1's testimony was reliable and could be acted upon.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in part: the conviction was recorded against the principal accused, while the acquittal of the remaining accused was left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: In an exceptional case where the record shows deliberate subversion of the trial, the Court may judicially notice authoritative findings from connected proceedings, draw adverse inference from the accused's conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, and act on an injured informant's written statement as a dying declaration even if the prosecution failed to formally exhibit it.