Mere error in a quasi-judicial compromise order is not misconduct absent mala fides, corruption, or other improper motive.

Disciplinary proceedings against a Presiding Officer of the DRT cannot be sustained merely because a compromise order and closure of recovery proceedings are later viewed as commercially unwise or legally erroneous. Where the record showed that the bank sought acceptance of the settlement and stood by it, and there was no allegation of corrupt motive, ulterior consideration, mala fides, recklessness, or undue favour, the statutory protection for acts done in good faith applied. Mere error in the exercise of quasi-judicial power is not misconduct, and disciplinary action based only on disagreement with the judicial order was quashed.

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Issues: Whether disciplinary proceedings could be sustained against a Presiding Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal for passing an order allowing compromise and closing recovery proceedings, in the absence of any allegation of corrupt motive, ulterior consideration or mala fides, and whether the impugned charge-sheet was protected by the statutory scheme governing withdrawal of recovery certificates and acts done in good faith.

Analysis: The statutory framework empowered the Presiding Officer to issue a recovery certificate on the basis of the Tribunal's order and also to withdraw the certificate by intimation to the Recovery Officer. The record showed that the bank itself had sought acceptance of the compromise, had stated that the one-time settlement was sanctioned in accordance with its policy, and had affirmed that it stood by the settlement. The charge-sheet proceeded essentially on the ground that the compromise amount was commercially low and that the order was allegedly erroneous. The governing authorities relied upon in the judgment draw a clear line between mere error in the exercise of quasi-judicial power and misconduct warranting disciplinary action: something more than an incorrect judicial decision is required, such as recklessness, extraneous considerations, undue favour, corruption, or lack of good faith. In the absence of such allegations, disciplinary action based solely on the merits of the judicial order cannot be sustained. The protection for acts done in good faith under the Act also applied on the facts found.

Conclusion: The charge-sheet and the consequential disciplinary proceedings were unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: A judicial officer cannot be subjected to disciplinary proceedings merely because a compromise order is later viewed as commercially unwise or legally erroneous, unless the allegation is supported by material showing mala fides, corruption, or other improper motive.

Ratio Decidendi: Mere error in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power does not constitute misconduct; disciplinary action requires additional material showing recklessness, extraneous influence, undue favour, corrupt motive, or absence of good faith.

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