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Issues: Whether the order summoning a witness under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was justified and liable to be quashed in exercise of inherent powers.
Analysis: Section 311 is in two parts. The first part confers a discretionary power to summon, recall, or re-examine a witness at any stage, and that discretion must be exercised on well-settled judicial principles. The second part is mandatory where the evidence of the witness appears essential to the just decision of the case. A direction passed under the first part may be interfered with if it has occasioned a failure of justice. On the facts, the witness was not shown to be essential for the just decision of the case, the prosecution had closed its evidence, the accused had been examined, and the matter was fixed for final arguments. Reopening the trial at that stage would defeat the object of a session trial being completed in one session.
Conclusion: The impugned order was not justified under the mandatory part of Section 311 and was liable to be interfered with; the petition was allowed and the summoning order was quashed.
Ratio Decidendi: Power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is discretionary in its first limb and mandatory only when the witness's evidence is essential to the just decision of the case; a summons order under the discretionary limb can be quashed if it is unnecessary and causes failure of justice.