Corporation supersession upheld where no prior inquiry was mandatory and subjective satisfaction rested on relevant material.

A former Chairman was held to have locus standi to challenge the supersession of the Corporation because his office and emoluments were directly affected and he was not a stranger to the dispute. Section 38 was treated as an independent supersession power, so a prior inquiry under Section 36 was not mandatory; allegations of mala fides also failed on the facts. The notification was not invalid for absence of recorded reasons or non-supply of an inquiry report, since the statute did not require reasons in the notification and the grounds had been communicated. The record showed relevant material for the Government's subjective satisfaction, and the Central Government's approval and ministerial action were upheld as valid under the Business Rules and Article 166.

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Issues: (i) whether the petitioner, as former Chairman, had locus standi to challenge the supersession of the Corporation; (ii) whether the supersession was vitiated for want of a prior inquiry under Section 36, for mala fides, for want of reasons or supply of an inquiry report, or for absence of material; and (iii) whether the approval of the Central Government and the ministerial exercise of power were invalid.

Issue (i): whether the petitioner, as former Chairman, had locus standi to challenge the supersession of the Corporation.

Analysis: The petitioner's office and emoluments were directly affected by supersession, and the challenge was not by a stranger. The objection that only the Corporation could maintain the challenge was not accepted, particularly where mala fides and direct personal grievance were pleaded.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to maintain the writ petition.

Issue (ii): whether the supersession was vitiated for want of a prior inquiry under Section 36, for mala fides, for want of reasons or supply of an inquiry report, or for absence of material.

Analysis: Section 38 was treated as an independent power not controlled by Section 36, and a separate inquiry under Section 36 was held not obligatory before supersession. The allegations of mala fides were found unsubstantiated. The order was held not bad merely because the notification itself did not record reasons, since the statute did not require reasons to be stated in the notification and the grounds had been communicated. The alleged inquiry report of the Home Commissioner was found not to be a supersession report requiring disclosure. The record disclosed material relevant to the Corporation's functioning, strike, discipline, vehicles, and implementation of directions, sufficient for the Government's subjective satisfaction.

Conclusion: The supersession was held not to be vitiated on these grounds.

Issue (iii): whether the approval of the Central Government and the ministerial exercise of power were invalid.

Analysis: The Central Government's approval was accepted as having been obtained after consideration of the relevant papers, and no pleaded challenge to the approving authority's competence was found. The minister was held competent under the Business Rules and could rely on departmental notes and material placed before him; this did not amount to unlawful delegation. The argument based on non-placement before the Governor was rejected in view of Article 166.

Conclusion: The approval and ministerial action were held valid.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed in its challenge to the supersession order and the related administrative action, and no ground was found to warrant interference under Article 226.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory supersession order based on the Government's subjective satisfaction will not be struck down where the statute does not require a prior inquiry or recorded reasons in the notification, the affected person has a direct grievance sufficient to maintain the writ, and the record discloses relevant material showing consideration of the objections and approval by the competent authority.

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