Constructive res judicata and expired land grants cannot create a perpetual right to remain in possession under the 1966 regime.

Constructive res judicata applies in writ proceedings and bars a party from raising a plea that was available but not pleaded in earlier litigation; the later challenge was therefore not maintainable. The 1966 Regulations did not confer any perpetual right on an expired grantee to remain in possession until a ground under Regulation 151 arose, because the scheme limits grants to a fixed period, treats tenants and grantees differently, and preserves pre-existing obligations to surrender possession under the saving clause. An expired grant could not be converted into an indefinite right of occupation under the repealed regime.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appellants were barred by constructive res judicata from resisting eviction on the basis that they had a right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations independent of renewal or a fresh grant; (ii) whether the 1966 Regulations conferred any right on an expired grantee to remain in possession indefinitely until a ground under Regulation 151 arose.

Issue (i): Whether the appellants were barred by constructive res judicata from resisting eviction on the basis that they had a right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations independent of renewal or a fresh grant.

Analysis: The plea that the appellants had an independent right to continue in occupation under the 1966 regime was available to them in the earlier round of litigation and ought to have been raised then. The earlier proceedings had already addressed the absence of entitlement to renewal or fresh grant, and the later attempt to recast the challenge on a different legal basis was held to be impermissible. The doctrine of constructive res judicata applies to writ proceedings and bars matters which could and ought to have been pleaded earlier.

Conclusion: The appellants were barred from raising the plea in the present proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether the 1966 Regulations conferred any right on an expired grantee to remain in possession indefinitely until a ground under Regulation 151 arose.

Analysis: The scheme of the 1966 Regulations classifies tenants, grantees and licensees separately, and Regulation 146 limits a grant to a maximum period of thirty years with one renewal for a like period. Regulation 151 deals with ejectment grounds applicable to tenants and cannot be used to create a perpetual right in an expired grantee. Regulation 211 preserves liabilities and obligations incurred under the repealed 1926 Regulation, so the expiry-based obligation to surrender possession continues notwithstanding repeal. Regulation 144 does not enlarge an expired grant into a perpetual right; it only preserves rights and liabilities consistent with the new regime.

Conclusion: The 1966 Regulations do not confer any right of perpetual occupation on an expired grantee, and the appellants had no enforceable right to remain in possession after expiry of the grant period.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to eviction failed because the appellants could not reopen an issue that should have been raised earlier, and the statutory scheme did not support continued occupation beyond the expiry of the grant.

Ratio Decidendi: A plea that was available but not raised in earlier writ proceedings is barred by constructive res judicata, and a repealed land-tenure regime does not convert an expired grant into a perpetual right to remain in possession when the saving clause preserves the original obligation to surrender the land.

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