Appellants barred from resisting eviction based on acquired rights under 1966 Regulations. Res judicata principles applied.

The appellants were debarred from resisting eviction based on acquired rights under the 1966 Regulations. The court held that the appellants should have raised the issue of their right to continue in possession in a previous litigation and are now barred from doing so under the principles of res judicata. Additionally, the court concluded that the 1966 Regulations do not confer any right upon the grantees to stay in possession beyond the grant period, and the appellants' protection ceased in 1994 with the expiry of the 60-year period. The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellants are debarred from resisting eviction based on acquired rights under the 1966 Regulation.
2. Whether the 1966 Regulations confer any right upon the grantees to stay in possession beyond the grant period.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Debarment from Resisting Eviction
Background and Arguments:
- The appellants argued that the order passed by the Supreme Court in the previous litigation allowed them to resist eviction on grounds other than renewal or fresh grant. They contended that they had acquired a right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations until one of the contingencies in Regulation 151 arose.
- The respondents countered that this contention was an abuse of the process of law, as the appellants should have raised this issue in the previous litigation.

Court's Analysis and Conclusion:
- The court noted that the appellants had previously sought a fresh grant, which was declined by the Lieutenant Governor. The High Court had held that the appellants could not be evicted unless the land was needed for public purpose, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
- The court emphasized that the appellants could and should have raised the issue of their right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations in the previous litigation. Since they did not, they are now debarred from doing so based on the principles of constructive res judicata.
- The court cited several precedents to affirm that the principles of res judicata apply to writ proceedings, thereby barring the appellants from raising this new contention.

Conclusion:
- The appellants are debarred from resisting eviction on the ground that they have acquired the right to continue in possession under the 1966 Regulations.

Issue 2: Rights Under the 1966 Regulations
Background and Arguments:
- The appellants relied on Regulations 141 to 146 and 151 of the 1966 Regulations, arguing that as grantees under the 1926 Regulations, they had rights and liabilities under the 1966 Regulations, and could not be evicted except on grounds enumerated in Regulation 151.
- The respondents argued that the appellants' interpretation was flawed, as Regulation 151 applied to tenants, not grantees whose grant period had expired.

Court's Analysis and Conclusion:
- The court analyzed the relevant regulations, noting that the appellants were classified as grantees under Regulation 144, and that their grant had expired, obliging them to surrender possession.
- The court highlighted Regulation 211, which preserved liabilities incurred under the 1926 Regulations, meaning the appellants' obligation to surrender possession continued despite the repeal of the 1926 Regulations.
- The court rejected the appellants' argument that Regulation 144(1)(a) extinguished their liability to surrender possession, stating that this regulation only allowed grantees to continue under the same obligations and rights as under the 1966 Regulations, not in perpetuity.
- The court concluded that the appellants could not stay in possession beyond the 60-year period allowed under both the 1926 and 1966 Regulations.

Conclusion:
- The 1966 Regulations do not confer any right upon the grantees to stay in possession beyond the grant period, and the appellants' protection ceased in 1994 with the expiry of the 60-year period.

Final Judgment:
The appeal is dismissed, and the appellants are debarred from raising new contentions regarding their right to stay in possession. The 1966 Regulations do not allow them to remain in possession beyond the grant period. No costs were awarded.

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