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Issues: (i) Whether the suit, on the plaint allegations, was one for relief on the ground of fraud attracting Article 95 or Article 91 of the Limitation Act, or whether it was a suit for a declaration governed by Article 120; (ii) whether the pleaded case that the instrument was signed under a mistaken belief as to its nature rendered the deed void ab initio so that no prior setting aside was necessary; (iii) whether limitation was postponed by fraud under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
Issue (i): Whether the suit, on the plaint allegations, was one for relief on the ground of fraud attracting Article 95 or Article 91 of the Limitation Act, or whether it was a suit for a declaration governed by Article 120.
Analysis: The plaint proceeded on the footing that the document executed in 1906 was not merely voidable but was no deed at all, because the executant believed that she was signing a power of attorney while in fact she was induced to sign a deed of exchange and gift. On that footing, the substance of the relief sought was a declaration of title to the compensation money, and not a substantive prayer to set aside an operative instrument. A case of this kind falls outside the article applicable to suits for setting aside an instrument and falls within the residuary article for declaratory relief.
Conclusion: Article 120 applied, not Article 95 or Article 91.
Issue (ii): Whether the pleaded case that the instrument was signed under a mistaken belief as to its nature rendered the deed void ab initio so that no prior setting aside was necessary.
Analysis: Where the maker of the document never intended to execute the instrument actually signed, the plea is that of non est factum. If that plea succeeds, the instrument is void from the beginning and does not merely require cancellation. In such a situation, a prayer to set aside the instrument is superfluous, because the legal effect of the pleading is that no valid execution ever occurred.
Conclusion: The pleaded instrument, if proved as alleged, would be void ab initio and would not require setting aside.
Issue (iii): Whether limitation was postponed by fraud under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.
Analysis: The plaint alleged that the true nature of the transaction was concealed from the executant until 23 January 1915. If that allegation were established, Section 18 would defer the commencement of limitation until that date. Six years from that date had not expired when the suit was filed in December 1920.
Conclusion: Limitation was extended by fraud, and the suit was within time.
Final Conclusion: The dismissal of the suit could not stand. The appeal succeeded, the matter was sent back for trial on the merits, and the questions of fact underlying the alleged transaction remained open for evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: A document executed under a mistaken belief as to its very nature is void ab initio and need not be set aside, so a suit seeking a declaration of title based on that plea is governed by the residuary article of limitation, with fraud postponing time under Section 18 where concealment is proved.