Section 34(4) permits only limited adjournment to cure challenge grounds, not a full remand of the arbitral award.

Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is confined to an adjournment of setting-aside proceedings so the arbitral tribunal may eliminate grounds for challenge; it does not authorise a court to remand the award for a fresh decision on all issues. The tribunal retains discretion to decide whether to act and what steps are needed to cure the defect, including any procedural prejudice. A remand for de novo reconsideration was therefore inconsistent with Section 34(4), and the order was modified to a limited adjournment-oriented course.

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Issues: Whether an order under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can remit an award back to the arbitral tribunal for fresh consideration on all issues, and whether the court's power under that provision is confined to adjourning the setting-aside proceedings to enable the tribunal to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award.

Analysis: Section 34(4) is distinct from the remand power under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is linked to an application for setting aside under Section 34(1) and operates only when the court considers it appropriate and a party requests it. The provision does not authorise the court to send the matter back for a wholesale re-hearing or to dictate the scope of the tribunal's further exercise. Its purpose is limited to allowing the tribunal an opportunity to resume proceedings or to take such other action as, in its opinion, will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. The tribunal retains discretion whether to act, and may then decide what steps are necessary, including dealing with any procedural defect that caused prejudice.

Conclusion: The order remitting the award for fresh consideration on all issues was not in tune with Section 34(4), but the existence of grounds for setting aside was upheld only prima facie. The revision was therefore allowed to a limited extent by modifying the order into an adjournment under Section 34(4), leaving the tribunal free to decide whether and how to eliminate the grounds.

Final Conclusion: The court held that Section 34(4) permits only a limited adjournment-oriented exercise to cure curable grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, not a full remand for de novo reconsideration; the impugned order was modified accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the court may only adjourn the setting-aside proceedings to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to eliminate the grounds for challenge, and cannot itself order a fresh remand for reconsideration of all issues.

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