Execution proceedings over vacant land: loss of control through court delivery can amount to dispossession, and title disputes go before the executing court.

In execution of a decree for specific performance, a third party in possession of vacant land under registered sale deeds was treated as dispossessed when court delivery of possession caused loss of control over the property, so an application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC was maintainable. The amended execution scheme was read as a complete code requiring the executing court itself to decide all questions of right, title and interest under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101, rather than driving the objector to a separate suit. The objectors' appeal succeeded, the contrary view was set aside, and the matter was remanded for decision on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether an objector in possession of vacant land under registered sale deeds could maintain an application under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on being dispossessed in execution of a decree for specific performance; (ii) Whether questions of right, title or interest between the decree-holder and the objector were required to be adjudicated by the executing court under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 rather than by a separate suit.

Issue (i): Whether an objector in possession of vacant land under registered sale deeds could maintain an application under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on being dispossessed in execution of a decree for specific performance.

Analysis: The expression "dispossessed" was held to have a contextual meaning. In the case of vacant land, possession depends on control and the ability to exclude others, and not necessarily on physical presence at the time of execution. Where delivery of possession through the court results in loss of control over the land by a third party claiming under registered sale deeds, the third party is treated as dispossessed for the purpose of Rule 99. A narrow construction limited to actual and physical ouster would defeat the object of the amended execution scheme.

Conclusion: The application under Order XXI Rule 99 was maintainable and the objectors were entitled to invoke that provision.

Issue (ii): Whether questions of right, title or interest between the decree-holder and the objector were required to be adjudicated by the executing court under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 rather than by a separate suit.

Analysis: The amended provisions of Order XXI were construed as a complete code intended to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to enable the executing court itself to decide all questions relevant to the application, including title and possession. The executing court was therefore competent to record evidence and decide the rival claims of the decree-holder and the objectors. The High Court erred in limiting the meaning of dispossession and in not examining the merits of the rival claims after rejecting maintainability.

Conclusion: The executing court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the competing claims, and the High Court's contrary view was incorrect.

Final Conclusion: The appeal by the objectors succeeded, the High Court's order was set aside, and the matter was remanded for fresh decision on the merits; the connected special leave petition was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: In execution proceedings concerning vacant land, a third party who loses control over the property by delivery of possession through court is treated as dispossessed within Order XXI Rule 99, and all questions of right, title and interest arising from such an application must be determined by the executing court under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101.

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