Writ jurisdiction under amended Article 226 remains available despite alternative remedies, subject to strict limits on interim relief.

The amended Article 226 was interpreted as limiting writ relief only where an alternative remedy is adequate, efficacious, convenient and beneficial; a writ remains available where the impugned action is without jurisdiction or the alternative remedy is not real. The High Court's interim-order power continues, but is controlled by Article 226(4) to (6), which require notice, restrict ex parte relief, and bar interim orders in specified public-interest categories. Section 58 of the Forty-second Amendment Act does not govern pending appeals from finally decided writ petitions, and the High Court may entertain a petition on the constitutional validity of a Central law, though it cannot itself decide that validity. These restrictions apply to all Article 226 petitions.

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Issues: (i) Whether Article 226(3) bars a writ petition merely because another remedy exists, (ii) whether the High Court may grant interim relief in petitions under amended Article 226, (iii) whether Section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 applies to pending appeals from decisions under the original Article 226, (iv) whether the High Court can entertain a petition raising only the constitutional validity of a Central law, and (v) whether Article 226(4) to (6) applies to all petitions under Article 226.

Issue (i): Whether Article 226(3) bars a writ petition merely because another remedy exists.

Analysis: The amended provision was construed in light of the pre-existing rule that alternative remedy was a rule of self-limitation and not an absolute bar. The phrase "any other remedy" was held to mean an adequate and efficacious remedy having regard to the nature of the injury, the relief sought, the urgency of the matter, and the practical availability of redress. A writ could still lie where the impugned action was wholly without jurisdiction or where the alternative remedy was not real, adequate, or efficacious.

Conclusion: The existence of another remedy does not by itself bar the writ jurisdiction. The bar operates only where the alternative remedy is adequate, efficacious, convenient, and beneficial having regard to the relief sought.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court may grant interim relief in petitions under amended Article 226.

Analysis: Clauses (4) to (6) were read according to their plain language. They regulate interim orders by requiring notice and opportunity of hearing, permitting ex parte interim relief only exceptionally for short duration and on recorded reasons, and prohibiting interim orders in the specified categories where delay would affect public importance, criminal inquiry, public utility work, or acquisition for such work.

Conclusion: The High Court retains power to make interim orders, but that power is subject to the restrictions and prohibitions contained in Article 226(4) to (6).

Issue (iii): Whether Section 58 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 applies to pending appeals from decisions under the original Article 226.

Analysis: The expression "pending petition" was given its natural meaning as the original writ petition itself. The section did not contain language showing an intention to disturb vested rights arising from a petition already finally decided before the appointed day. An appeal from such a decision was treated as a distinct proceeding and not as a pending petition within the meaning of Section 58.

Conclusion: Pending appeals from orders finally deciding writ petitions under the original Article 226 are not governed by Section 58.

Issue (iv): Whether the High Court can entertain a petition raising only the constitutional validity of a Central law.

Analysis: Article 226A was treated as consequential to Article 131A. It prohibited the High Court from deciding the constitutional validity of a Central law, but did not prevent the High Court from entertaining a petition or considering whether a reference to the Supreme Court was required. The High Court could still exercise its ordinary powers under Article 226 pending such reference machinery.

Conclusion: The High Court can entertain such a petition, though it cannot itself determine the constitutional validity of the Central law.

Issue (v): Whether Article 226(4) to (6) applies to all petitions under Article 226.

Analysis: The language of the clauses was held to be clear and unambiguous. No words were read down to confine them to petitions under Article 226(1)(b) and (c). The restrictions on interim orders therefore apply to every petition under Article 226, including petitions for enforcement of fundamental rights.

Conclusion: Article 226(4) to (6) applies to all petitions falling under Article 226.

Final Conclusion: The amended constitutional scheme was upheld as curtailing writ and interim-order powers in the specified respects, while preserving High Court jurisdiction subject to the adequacy of alternative remedies and the reference procedure for Central-law validity.

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